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Scholars have long recognized that a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation wielding robust domestic intelligence-collection 
powers poses a threat to civil liberties. Yet the FBI’s post-9/11 
mandate to prevent terrorist attacks (not merely investigate 
completed attacks) demands that the agency engage in broad 
intelligence-collection activities within the United States—
activities that can threaten fundamental freedoms. This Article 
argues that strategies derived from administrative law principles 
can help alleviate the tendency of threat-prevention efforts to erode 
civil liberties.  
The fundamental problem this Article tackles is that the 
traditional governance mechanisms we rely upon to protect 
individual rights are ineffective in the domestic intelligence-
collection realm. This failure of traditional checks stems from, 
first, the absence of practical constraints to channel the enormous 
discretion that the Justice Department and the FBI enjoy in 
determining the scope and nature of the FBI’s domestic 
6intelligence-collection activities; second, the lack of judicial or 
political checks on these activities, resulting in a deficit of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability; and third, the risk that 
the FBI’s singular focus on terrorism prevention will overwhelm 
rights-protection concerns.  
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Drawing on principles of administrative law, this Article 
explains how regulatory strategies can be employed to improve 
governance of domestic intelligence gathering. It recommends 
imposing procedural requirements on the exercise of discretion, 
facilitating meaningful pluralist input into relevant decision 
making processes, and augmenting the attention given to civil 
liberties concerns by requiring the Justice Department to prepare 
Civil Liberties Impact Statements and by including in the process 
an entity whose primary goal is the protection of civil liberties. 
These governance reforms will prompt domestic intelligence 
regulation to take account of civil liberties while preserving the 
ability of law enforcement to pursue security. 
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I. Introduction 
In the summer of 2013, former National Security Agency 
contractor and Central Intelligence Agency employee Edward 
Snowden shook the world with revelations of extensive United 
States government surveillance activities—including surveillance 
of American citizens.1 The revelations sparked a renewed debate 
about the proper scope of intelligence collection in a democracy. 
What has gone unaddressed in this debate, however, is the vast 
investigative powers conferred on America’s domestic 
surveillance agency—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
And unlike the foreign-intelligence programs disclosed by 
Snowden’s leaks, some of the FBI’s most powerful domestic 
intelligence-collection authorities include neither statutory limits 
nor judicial oversight.2  
If the FBI determines that an individual’s daily life is 
relevant to a terrorism investigation, it can easily draw a detailed 
picture of that life.3 With no reason at all for suspicion and no 
judicial approval, agents can follow the individual around the 
clock to ascertain where he goes. They can ask his neighbors 
about their conversations with him, or dispatch an informant to 
his house of worship to report on the individual’s religious 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of 
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013) (discussing the NSA’s collection of millions of American’s phone records 
from Verizon) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See infra Part II (discussing the nature of intelligence collection). 
 3. See infra Part II.A (describing sophisticated data-mining tools that 
allow the government to “render a detailed dossier on any American”). 
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observance. With the minimal process associated with issuing an 
administrative subpoena,4 the government can establish a record 
of the individual’s movements and social dealings by acquiring 
financial and employment records, a list of email addresses with 
which he has corresponded, and a list of phone numbers he has 
dialed.  
These broad investigative powers operate in tension with 
fundamental rights. Collecting extensive personal information 
about innocent Americans raises concerns about privacy; about 
impact on freedoms of expression, association, and religious 
practice; and to the extent that such activity is disproportionately 
focused on particular communities, it can raise equal protection 
concerns as well.5 The challenge, then, is how to mitigate these 
civil liberties threats without unduly interfering with the FBI’s 
ability to prevent terrorist attacks.  
This Article argues that administrative law strategies 
suggest several measures that, taken together, would represent a 
domestic intelligence governance regime better equipped to 
safeguard civil liberties. This argument bridges a gap between 
two growing areas of literature. The first, which I label “risk-
management literature,” advocates taking a regulatory approach 
to the threat of terrorism—to treating it not as an enemy to 
defeat, but, like environmental or health and safety risks, as a 
chronic problem to be assessed and managed.6 The other, the 
                                                                                                     
 4. Infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part II.A (discussing the FBI’s broad intelligence-collection 
powers and the negative impact those powers can have on individual liberties). 
 6. See Samuel Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 U.S.C. L. REV. 575, 
582 (2010) (advocating a regulatory approach to domestic intelligence); Eric 
Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 681, 696 (2002) (describing the need for regulation in order to reduce 
the risk of terrorist attacks); Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution 
Against Terrorism, 9 J. RISK RESEARCH 393, 413 (2006) (analogizing the push for 
antiterrorism legislation to previous movements for more health and 
environmental legislation); Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 
26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 129–31 (2003) (describing the effect public fear 
and probability neglect play in movements for environmental and health 
legislation and speculating what that effect should mean for counterterrorism 
regulation); James B. Comey, Intelligence Under the Law, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 439, 
442–44 (2007) (discussing the importance of adhering to legal institutions, even 
in the intelligence community).  
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“rights-protection literature,” argues that the current domestic 
intelligence-collection governance regime fails to address 
effectively the tension with civil liberties created by the FBI’s 
contemporary counterterrorism efforts.7 I contend that the risk-
management literature’s valuable insight that administrative law 
can usefully be applied to improve governance in the security 
context suggests a means of mitigating the rights-protection 
scholars’ concerns.  
These rights-protection concerns arise in large part because 
traditional means of regulating executive power cannot 
effectively protect civil liberties in this area. This failure of 
traditional checks results from three characteristics of the regime 
regulating domestic intelligence collection. First, it lacks both 
doctrinal and practical constraints on the FBI and Justice 
Department’s enormous discretion in drafting and implementing 
the applicable rules.8 Second, the checks that normally ensure the 
accountability and democratic legitimacy of government actions—
judicial review, congressional oversight, and public scrutiny—
simply do not operate effectively in the secretive world of 
intelligence collection.9 And third, in its vigorous pursuit of 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General 
and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013) 
[hereinafter Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within] (discussing the legislature 
and courts’ reluctance to restrict the executive’s power when it infringes on civil 
liberties in furtherance of national security); Amna A. Akbar, Policing 
“Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the 
government’s monitoring of religious groups in an effort to prevent members of 
those groups from turning to violence); Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law 
Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 BROOK. 
L. REV. 41, 42 (2011) [hereinafter Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement] 
(discussing the First Amendment concerns raised when law enforcement selects 
individuals for questioning based on their speech and associations); Rascoff, 
supra note 6, at 586 (stating that the protection of civil liberties should factor 
into the review of intelligence gathering actions). 
 8. See infra Parts II.A & II.B.1 (discussing the lack of judicial and 
legislative oversight over intelligence collection and the lack of practical 
restraints on the FBI when it prioritizes the collection of data over everything 
else). 
 9. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the lack of judicial, political, and public 
oversight over intelligence collection). 
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terrorism prevention, the FBI is not subject to any structural 
checks to prevent it from undervaluing rights protection.10  
This broad discretion, democracy deficit, and absence of 
counterweight to the FBI’s prevention goal means that—despite 
the privacy and liberty implications of the FBI’s activities—the 
responsibility of striking a balance between security needs and 
other important interests is left almost entirely to the Attorney 
General and the FBI itself. Restraints on the FBI’s domestic 
intelligence-collection activities come from the Attorney General’s 
Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Guidelines)11 and the 
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG).12 The 
Guidelines are developed by the Attorney General and set out a 
basic framework for the FBI’s operations; the several-hundred-
page DIOG, promulgated by the FBI, specifies more detailed 
rules for the Guidelines’ implementation.13 The Guidelines were 
originally created to forestall impending legislative efforts to 
cabin the Bureau’s intelligence-collection powers14 but due to 
subsequent changes—particularly post-9/11 changes aimed at 
promoting terrorism-prevention efforts—the Guidelines and 
DIOG now serve to facilitate rather than limit the Bureau’s 
intelligence-collection role.  
                                                                                                     
 10. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing the FBI’s primary focus on national 
security and intelligence gathering, and the fact that privacy concerns are 
viewed as a hurdle to effective policymaking). 
 11. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES]. 
 12. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC 
INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (2011) [hereinafter DIOG]. 
 13. Id. Initially secret in its entirety, Freedom of Information Act requests 
prompted the Justice Department to release the DIOG—with significant 
redactions. See Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 833 F. Supp. 2d 106, 
109 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that the release of the DIOG under a FOIA 
request was proper, but that the FBI was permitted to redact certain portions of 
the DIOG); Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 826 F. Supp. 2d 157, 
174 (D.D.C. 2011) (directing the Department of Justice to release more detailed 
descriptions of the U.S. and European Union’s discussions over the 
international exchange of personal information). 
 14. See infra Part II (discussing the original goal of the Levi Guidelines to 
“strictly curtail domestic intelligence investigations”). 
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Conceptualizing the threat of terrorism as a regulatory 
challenge represents a significant first step toward devising an 
improved governance regime for the Guidelines and the DIOG. 
But there are additional steps that the existing risk-management 
literature has not yet taken. The idea of how administrative law 
would apply to intelligence collection remains undertheorized—
an unsurprising state of affairs given the recent emergence of this 
line of inquiry. Scholars have not yet tackled the thorny question 
of how to truly reap the benefits that the regulatory approach 
offers, while simultaneously taking into account the unique 
governance challenges presented by the domestic-intelligence 
context. Nor has the literature to date sufficiently grappled with 
civil liberties concerns.15 
This Article seeks to fill these gaps, drawing on 
administrative law principles to suggest novel governance 
designs custom tailored to address the civil liberties concerns 
inherent in domestic intelligence collection. To do so it looks to 
areas of administrative law that present similar governance 
challenges, identifies how those challenges have been addressed 
in the administrative state, and suggests how to adapt those 
strategies to function in the intelligence-collection context.16  
Each of the governance challenges this Article identifies has 
an analog in the administrative state. Take first the scope of 
discretion conferred on federal officials. This delegation of 
discretionary authority to the Attorney General and the FBI 
resembles the broad delegations in statutes establishing 
administrative agencies’ powers and responsibilities. Concerns 
arising from the scope of these delegations are addressed through 
                                                                                                     
 15. A recent proposal to develop a risk-management approach to 
intelligence-collection governance by employing traditional agency oversight 
tools—centralized cost−benefit analysis, judicial review, and pluralist input into 
decision making, see Rascoff, supra note 6, at 633–47 (outlining a plan for 
regulatory governance of intelligence gathering agencies)—fails to incorporate 
effective civil liberties protections. See infra Part IV.A (discussing reform 
proposals that focus on improving the FBI’s ability to correctly assess the risks 
and account for the psychological costs of terrorism, while not addressing the 
civil liberties concerns the Guidelines implicate). 
 16. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the fact that the Guidelines and DIOG 
place civil liberties in a secondary role to the FBI’s intelligence gathering 
mission). 
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the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)17 procedural 
requirements.18 Second, the absence of judicial, legislative, or 
public involvement in the design and implementation of the 
Guidelines is reminiscent of the democracy deficit inherent in the 
promulgation of regulations by technical experts so often at the 
heart of debates over the legitimacy of the administrative state. 
The administrative state has responded to this deficit by 
developing mechanisms to increase the participatory nature of 
administrative activity.19 And third, the risk that the Guidelines 
privilege the FBI’s primary mission—the prevention of terrorism 
and protection of national security—over concerns for 
fundamental rights mirrors the many circumstances where 
agencies are charged simultaneously with multiple, competing 
goals. A menu of regulatory tools has been developed to reconcile 
competing agency missions.20 Looking to the lessons that can be 
gleaned from these administrative governance strategies provides 
a useful roadmap for filling the intelligence-collection governance 
gap in a way that also protects civil liberties.  
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II first argues that 
the expansive scope of investigative authority that the current 
Attorney General’s Guidelines and the FBI’s implementing 
procedures confer on the Bureau exist in tension with the 
protection of civil liberties. It then contends that the lack of 
practical, traditional judicial or political, and structural checks to 
impose effective oversight on domestic intelligence gathering 
necessitates the implementation of alternative governance 
mechanisms.  
In Part III, the Article harnesses administrative law 
strategies to suggest regulatory tools custom tailored to yield 
                                                                                                     
 17. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500–706 (2012)).   
 18. See infra Part III.A (describing the improvements that could be made 
by implementing administrative law strategies in the intelligence-collection 
context). 
 19. See infra Part III (describing the broad opportunities for participation 
in administrative rulemaking, and the democratic legitimacy that 
approximating such participation could create in the intelligence-collection 
realm). 
 20. See infra Part III.D (describing the methods that administrative 
governance uses to reconcile and balance competing policy goals). 
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regulatory benefits that protect fundamental rights in the context 
of the FBI’s Guidelines regime. To do so, it first explores the 
underlying purposes and justifications of traditional 
administrative law tools that are used to address governance 
challenges conceptually similar to those that the Guidelines 
regime presents.21 It then suggests specific reforms designed to 
achieve the same ends as those traditional tools in the 
intelligence-collection context.22 First, the Attorney General’s 
discretion in the development and implementation of the 
Guidelines should be subject to a reason-giving requirement. 
Specific procedural limitations should require that the Attorney 
General or FBI Director provide both notice of a decision to 
amend the Guidelines or the DIOG and written justifications for 
their ultimate decisions. Second, to enable meaningful pluralist 
input into the process, the FBI must go beyond the cursory 
meetings with interested stakeholders that it has relied upon to 
date. Instead, a variety of entities inside the government should 
be empowered to participate in the amendment process. Third, to 
balance the government’s interest in security with privacy and 
liberty concerns, (1) any changes to the Guidelines regime should 
be accompanied by a “Civil Liberties Impact Statement” prepared 
by the Justice Department, and (2) stakeholders whose primary 
goal is the protection of liberties—rather than the pursuit of 
security—should be involved in the process of drafting or 
modifying the Guidelines and their implementing regulations.23 
This approach will impose a meaningful governance regime 
crafted for domestic intelligence gathering that mitigates 
concerns about the impact on civil liberties without sacrificing 
security.  
Part IV addresses some possible sources of skepticism for 
this proposal. It first explains why reliance on existing 
administrative law tools—even if those tools are partially 
modified to operate in the intelligence-collection realm—will be 
                                                                                                     
 21. See infra Part III.C.1 (describing the administrative state’s response to 
the inherent democracy deficit present in administrative actions). 
 22. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing methods that could be used to 
introduce administrative procedures into intelligence collection). 
 23. See infra Part III.D.2 (proposing solutions which would allow the FBI to 
balance competing intelligence collection and civil liberties interests). 
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insufficient to protect civil liberties.24 It then responds to 
questions about how to enforce these reforms in the absence of 
judicial review, suggesting alternative compliance mechanisms.25  
II. The FBI’s Domestic Intelligence-Collection Powers 
Since the FBI’s inception, there has been tension embedded 
in its mission. It is charged not only with solving crimes but also 
with preventing them.26 While the two goals often complement 
one another, they call for very different types of investigative 
activities. Focus on crime solving argues for a set of investigative 
powers enabling inquiries into specific acts, with an eye toward 
successful prosecution of the perpetrators.27 Preventive work, by 
contrast, requires the collection of much broader swaths of 
information—information about illicit organizations, their 
members, their goals, their capacities, and their sources of 
funding as well as information about possible targets.28  
Over time, both the Bureau’s focus and the rules governing 
its activities have swung back and forth along the spectrum 
between the targeted investigations of crime solving and the 
broader intelligence gathering associated with prevention. The 
Guidelines themselves are the product of the FBI’s early-1970s 
move away from intelligence collection. After the United States 
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly known as the 
Church Committee for its chair Senator Frank Church (D-ID), 
                                                                                                     
 24. See infra Part IV.A (describing the inadequacies of administrative law 
tools alone). 
 25. See infra Part IV.B (addressing the fact that by its nature intelligence 
collection cannot be as transparent as traditional administrative procedures, 
and suggesting alternative compliance methods which can still alleviate some of 
the governance concerns implicated by intelligence collection). 
 26. See infra Part II.A (discussing the nature of the FBI). 
 27. See DIOG, supra note 12, Preamble (discussing broadly the 
investigative role of the FBI).  
 28. See Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1139–40 (2006) (discussing the hundreds of data 
mining operations being carried out by the United States government in order to 
prevent terrorist attacks). 
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revealed that decades of unregulated intelligence collection by the 
FBI had resulted in widespread abuses of the government’s 
investigative powers,29 Congress determined that the FBI should 
be subject to a legislative charter setting out strict limits on its 
intelligence-collection authority.30 In an effort to stave off 
potentially more restrictive legislative action, President Gerald 
Ford’s Attorney General, Edward Levi, issued in 1976 the first 
set of Attorney General’s Guidelines—known as the Levi 
Guidelines.31  
The Levi Guidelines strictly curtailed domestic intelligence 
investigations through a basic regulatory structure that 
subsequent versions of the Guidelines have largely retained.32 
                                                                                                     
 29. The Church Committee exposed a litany of intelligence-collection 
programs (most implemented under infamous long-time FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover) in which the FBI used widespread surveillance to harass and discredit 
law-abiding—though often antiwar or civil rights—groups and individuals based 
on their political beliefs. See SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS OF 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK III: FINAL REPORT 
OF THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP NO. 94-755, at 27 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH 
COMM. REPORT] (detailing the Committee’s findings). 
 30. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES 35 (2005) [hereinafter AGG COMPLIANCE REPORT] 
(discussing these limits). Other reforms prompted by the Church Committee 
include Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976) (banning 
assassinations) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 
Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) (2012)) 
(imposing limits on electronic foreign-intelligence surveillance). 
 31. The Guidelines, officially entitled Domestic Security Investigation 
Guidelines, “were intended . . . to diminish the perceived need for legislation to 
regulate and restrict” FBI activity. United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 
141, 190–91 (D. Mass. 1999); see also EDWARD LEVI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (Nov. 4, 1976) 
reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 18–26 (2d Sess. 1978) (describing the Guidelines as 
“intended . . . to diminish the perceived need for legislation to regulate and 
restrict” FBI activity); FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 307 
(1976) (discussing a possible statutory charter for the FBI). 
 32. See EMILY BERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE: NEW POWERS, NEW RISKS 11 (2011),) http://www.brennan 
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/AGGReportFINALed.pdf (discussing the fact 
that the “basic structure” from the Levi Guidelines “has been retained in all 
subsequent versions of the Guidelines”). 
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This structure consists of multiple investigative levels. For each 
successive level, a higher threshold of suspicion is necessary to 
proceed; the investigative tools agents may use are more 
intrusive; and procedural safeguards, such as the need for 
supervisory approval and limits on the temporal length of 
investigations, are more robust.33 The Guidelines continue to 
function as the primary constraint on the FBI’s operations and 
remain a justification for the lack of a statutory charter 
governing the FBI’s activities, but they have not remained 
static.34 Multiple modifications made in the years between 1976 
and 2001 eased, though ultimately retained, restrictions on 
intelligence collection.35  
With 9/11, however, came a wholesale rejection of the anti-
intelligence-collection mindset of the Levi era, resulting in a 
dramatic shift in favor of an aggressive prevention paradigm. The 
FBI’s prioritization of preventing terrorism was reflected not only 
in the allocation of its resources, its focus, and its conception of its 
core mission but also in some dramatic modifications to the 
Guidelines themselves.36 The eventual result was a set of 
                                                                                                     
 33. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC SECURITY 
INVESTIGATIONS (Nov. 4, 1976), reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings on 
S.1612 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Pt. 3, 95th Cong., 18–26 (2d 
Sess. 1978) (setting out the standards for opening an investigation, the 
investigative tactics available for each type of investigation, and what level of 
supervisory approval each type of investigation and tactic required, as well as 
time limits on investigations). For a more detailed description of the Levi 
Guidelines, see BERMAN, supra note 32, at 10–13. 
 34. See AGG COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 30, at 59 (“Attorneys General 
and FBI leadership have . . . referred to the FBI’s adherence to the Guidelines 
as the reason why the FBI should not be subjected to a general legislative 
charter or to statutory control.”). 
 35. For a detailed account of the historical evolution of the Guidelines, see 
BERMAN, supra note 32, at 8–25.  
 36. See Dan Eggan & Bob Woodward, F.B.I. Probe of Al Qaeda Implies 
Wide Presence, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2001, at A1 (“Attorney General John D. 
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III have repeatedly said they view 
preventing another terror attack as their main priority, rather than securing 
criminal convictions.”); Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-
Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 27−28 
(2005) (discussing Attorney General Ashcroft’s statements that terrorism 
prevention was the FBI and Justice Department’s “overriding priority”); Tom 
Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of 
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1204, 1228 (2004) (discussing the shifting 
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Guidelines—which were implemented by Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey in 2008 and remain in effect today—embodying 
an unprecedented license for domestic intelligence collection and 
delegating to the FBI responsibility for imposing limits on that 
power.37 
In this Part, Section A demonstrates the scope of some of the 
FBI’s contemporary intelligence-collection powers and their 
potential to create tension with privacy; rights of association, 
expression, and religious exercise; and equal protection 
principles.38 Section B then argues that the absence of 
nondoctrinal checks—whether practical, judicial, political, or 
                                                                                                     
priorities caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks); JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS, § VI 
(2002) [hereinafter ASHCROFT GUIDELINES] (proclaiming the FBI’s “central 
mission” as “preventing the commission of terrorist acts against the United 
States and its people”). 
 37. MICHAEL MUKASEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter MUKASEY 
GUIDELINES]. Attorney General Mukasey’s Guidelines, which remain in 
operation today, consolidate the Guidelines for criminal and domestic 
intelligence investigations with those for National Security Investigations and 
Foreign Intelligence Collection Guidelines. Id. § I.D.1. They also incorporate 
rules formerly contained in the Supplemental Guidelines for Collection, 
Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence; the Guidelines for 
Reporting and Use of Information Concerning Violation of Law and 
Authorization for Participating in Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign 
Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or International Terrorism Intelligence 
Investigations; and the Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and 
Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest. Id. 
 38. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and 
Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 162 (2012) (noting the 
friction with the Constitution’s Establishment Clause caused by the government 
espousing particular interpretations of Islam). The Guidelines have been subject 
to much criticism along these lines since 9/11. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 36, 
at 1231–54 (analyzing Attorney General Ashcroft’s new Guidelines and the 
dangers they pose to religious freedom, the threat that they create for racial and 
religious profiling, and the risk of inefficient use of resources); see also Daniel J. 
Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 
151–59 (2007) (suggesting that First Amendment claims arising out of domestic 
investigations should be cognizable); Linda E. Fisher, Guilty by Expressive 
Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 621, 643–57 (2004) (arguing that the law should bar federal officials 
from engaging in surveillance triggered by First Amendment activity without 
reasonable suspicion of a crime). 
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structural—on domestic intelligence collection means that the 
only constraints on the FBI’s intelligence-collection powers are 
the internal rules that the Justice Department and the FBI have 
imposed on themselves.  
A. The Scope of the FBI’s Intelligence-Collection Powers 
Statutory and constitutional doctrine provides very few 
limits on government access to a vast amount of information 
about innocent Americans.39 Any information that we have 
disclosed to a third-party individual or business entity, for 
example, lacks Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.40 Thus the Constitution 
places no limits on the collection of information contained in 
credit card transactions, bank records, Internet service provider 
(ISP) records, Amazon.com transaction histories, Facebook 
activities, electronic toll records, cell-tower location data (in some 
jurisdictions41), and even statements made to undercover agents 
or government informants—regardless of whether the agent or 
informant discloses his intention to share the contents of the 
conversation.42 The First Amendment similarly lacks purchase 
                                                                                                     
 39. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 589 (describing the “doctrinal vacuum” in 
the law of domestic intelligence); Anjali Dalal, Administrative Constitutionalism 
and The Re-Entrenchment of Surveillance Culture 24–29 (Mar. 4, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2236502 (arguing that contemporary constitutional 
norms surrounding surveillance practices are in part a result of the 
entrenchment over time of the policy preferences of the FBI, the Attorney 
General, and the President) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (stating that 
disclosure to a third party negates any expectation of privacy, and therefore 
Fourth Amendment does not apply); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 
(1979) (stating that when Smith dialed a phone number he was disclosing that 
number to the phone company, and therefore had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy over the fact that he dialed that number). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(stating that DEA did not violate Fourth Amendment when using cell phone to 
track location without a warrant). The Supreme Court has not ruled on this 
question. 
 42. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300–02 (1966) (stating that 
when an undercover informant was invited into the hotel room of the defendant, 
there was no expectation of privacy and therefore no Fourth Amendment issue). 
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here. Intelligence-collection powers that impact religious practice 
would likely run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause as a facial 
matter only if they were being implemented with the purpose of 
suppressing religious exercise.43 And if the Guidelines chill 
expression or curtail association, the activities they permit would 
be immune to facial constitutional challenge so long as they were 
narrowly tailored to further the compelling interesting in 
preventing terrorism, an interest that has been afforded great 
weight by the courts.44 Statutes provide only slightly more 
protection.45 
The permissiveness of the doctrine means that the FBI’s 
intelligence-collection powers face very few external legal 
constraints. In this doctrinal vacuum, the Attorney General was 
able to make several post-9/11 amendments to the Guidelines 
that facilitate an aggressive intelligence-collection role for the 
FBI. The first relevant amendment is the Guidelines’ expression 
of the FBI’s newly adopted preventive mission. Specific language 
explicitly affirms the FBI’s role in the intelligence community and 
specifies authority to collect, retain, and analyze information for 
intelligence purposes. The Guidelines declare that “[t]he FBI is 
an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency . . . 
[whose] functions accordingly extend beyond limited 
                                                                                                     
 43. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993) (noting that laws of general application need not be motivated by an 
important government interest, even if they infringe on individuals’ religious 
rights).  
 44. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 
2705, 2730 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment burden imposed by the 
criminal material support statute was outweighed by the government’s interest 
in national security). The Guidelines could be implemented in ways that are 
vulnerable to an as-applied challenge, but such challenges are likely futile for 
reasons explained in Part II.B.2. 
 45. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104–91, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.) (requiring the Attorney General to create guidelines that protect the 
privacy of patient information); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522 (2000)) (protecting the privacy of electronic communications, but expressly 
permitting disclosure to law enforcement agencies); Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (authorizing under specified circumstances 
electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information).   
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investigations of discrete matters”46 and urge the Bureau to use 
its analytic authority to “identify and understand trends, causes, 
and potential indicia of criminal activity and other threats to the 
United States that would not be apparent from the investigation 
of discrete matters alone.”47 To facilitate this analytical project, 
the Guidelines provide that all information collected “at all stages 
of investigative activity is . . . to be retained and disseminated for 
[intelligence purposes to facilitate the solution and prevention of 
crime, protect the national security, and further foreign 
intelligence objectives] regardless of whether it furthers 
investigative objectives in a narrower or more immediate 
sense.”48 Even information that wholly exonerates a group or 
individual from suspicion remains in government databases for 
storage, analysis (sometimes by algorithmic data-mining), and 
dissemination for inclusion in other government agencies’ 
databases.49  
The 2008 Mukasey Guidelines also expanded the Bureau’s 
collection powers to further its preventive mission—both with 
respect to what information it is permitted to collect and what 
tactics it may employ in that collection. The most significant of 
these expansions is the authorization of “assessments”—a new 
investigative stage. Assessments, which are inquiries designed to 
determine whether further investigation is warranted, require 
only an “authorized purpose,” meaning that the FBI must merely 
determine that it is acting to protect against criminal or national-
security threats, or to collect foreign intelligence.50 There is no 
need for any concrete facts, evidence, or reason to believe that the 
subject of an assessment is involved in criminal or threatening 
                                                                                                     
 46. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at Intro. B. 
 47. Id. § IV. 
 48. Id. § II. 
 49. The National Counterterrorism Center, a central depository for 
counterterrorism information, recently revised its guidelines to permit the 
retention for five years of information about Americans even when there is no 
suspicion of terrorist ties—increased from 180 days. Charlie Savage, U.S. 
Relaxes Limits on Use of Data in Terror Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/us-moves-to-relax-some-
restrictions-for-counterterrorism-analysis.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II. 
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activity.51 In other words, assessments may be undertaken in the 
absence of any “factual predicat[e].”52 Until 2008, some form of 
factual predication was required to initiate any level of 
investigation.53 The introduction of nonpredicated investigations 
is thus a significant expansion of the FBI’s power.  
Despite the absence of the need to establish a factual basis 
for an assessment, agents conducting assessments under the new 
Guidelines have available to them a wide array of highly 
intrusive investigative tools. During an assessment, the FBI may: 
(1) recruit and task informants to attend surreptitiously First 
Amendment-protected gatherings—such as religious services or 
political demonstrations—to collect information about what takes 
place there and who attends;54 (2) engage people in conversation 
while misrepresenting the agent’s status as a federal official (so-
called “pretext interviews”)—such as posing as an investigative 
target’s new neighbor or business associate in order to gather 
information about her from friends, neighbors, and colleagues;55 
(3) station agents outside a target’s home or office—or even have 
                                                                                                     
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, Washington Legislative 
Office, ACLU et al., to Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States (Oct. 20, 
2011), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf 
(noting that in “2008 [the Guidelines] removed any requirement of a factual 
predicate to justify a new type of investigation, called an ‘Assessment’”). 
 54. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II.A.4.e; J.M. Berger, Does 
the F.B.I. Have an Informant Problem?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/07/does_the_fbi_have_an_informa
nt_problem (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (discussing “growing media scrutiny” 
over the FBI’s professional informants’ conduct) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). Historically, the FBI has infiltrated political and religious 
groups for the purpose of disrupting their operations and creating a chilling 
effect on antigovernment expression. See Lininger, supra note 36, at 1235−36 
(discussing government infiltration of religious organizations); FREDERICK A. O. 
SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
IN A TIME OF TERROR 31–36 (2007) (describing the Church Committee’s findings 
regarding the FBI’s politically motivated investigations); Don Edwards, 
Reordering the Priorities of the FBI in Light of the End of the Cold War, 65 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 73 (1991) (describing politically motivated investigations in 
the 1980s). 
 55. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II.A.4.f (“Interview or 
request information from members of the public and private entities.”). 
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them followed—so that their movements are tracked day and 
night;56 and (4) search commercial online services and resources, 
records maintained by “other federal, state, local, or tribal, or 
foreign governmental entities or agencies,”57 and all FBI and 
Justice Department records.58 This includes the FBI’s National 
Security Branch’s data set “[c]omposed of government 
information, commercial databases and records acquired in 
criminal and terrorism probes”59 that includes international 
travel records of citizens and aliens; financial forms; hotel and 
rental car records; and credit card transaction records.60 The 
government can not only search these databases for particular 
information, but also use them to perform analysis based on a 
“pattern of behavior and search for that pattern in data sets.”61 
Ever-more sophisticated data-mining tools render a detailed 
dossier on any American—even one entirely above suspicion—
just one mouse click away. Thus, the Guidelines now permit, with 
no factual predicate, tactics that before 9/11 had been reserved 
for investigative stages whose initiation required at least some 
relevant evidence.62 
                                                                                                     
 56. See id. § II.A.4.h (“Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring 
a court order.”). 
 57. Id. § II.A.4.c. As of 2009, the FBI planned to expand this data set to 
include tax records from nonprofit organizations, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FBI, 
NAT’L SECURITY ANALYSIS CTR., AN ELEMENT OF THE FBI’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
BRANCH (2006), and the Bureau has launched a database of biometric 
information, which includes “[d]igital images of faces, fingerprints and palm 
patterns.” Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics: $1 
Billion Project to Include Images of Irises and Faces, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007, 
at A1. 
 58. See Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention 
Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408, 1425 
(2003) (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft); ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 
36, §§ VI.A. & B (allowing the FBI to use other governmental agencies’ 
information and information from previous investigations when pursuing 
intelligence collection in counterterrorism activities). 
 59. Ryan Singel, Newly Declassified Files Detail Massive FBI Data-Mining 
Project, WIRED.COM (Sept. 23, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 
2009/09/fbi-nsac/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 60. See id. (describing the breadth of the FBI’s data-mining project). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See BERMAN, supra note 32, at 13–21 (discussing the erosion of the 
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Even investigative tactics statutorily limited to instances in 
which there is a factual basis for suspicion may be permitted 
based on very tenuous links to suspected wrongdoing. Agents can 
issue National Security Letters (NSLs)—a form of administrative 
subpoena—to access without a court order certain information 
about individuals that is “relevant” to a terrorism investigation.63 
The relevance standard means that the individual about whom 
the FBI seeks information—internet or telephone subscriber 
information (possibly including cell-phone-generated location 
data providing a minute-by-minute account of an individual’s 
movements64), internet search records, financial records—need 
not herself be a target of an investigation. And after acquiring a 
court order under § 215 of the PATRIOT Act65, the FBI may 
demand an even broader swath of information—“any tangible 
thing” that is “relevant to” “a full investigation,”66 a definition the 
government has interpreted to include the authority to collect all 
noncontent data regarding phone calls into, out of, and within the 
United States.67  
                                                                                                     
protections provided by the Levi Guidelines). 
 63. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 
272, 365 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (setting out a “relevance” 
standard for obtaining information through use of National Security Letters); 
DIOG, supra note 12, § 18.6.6 (discussing the National Security Letter process). 
 64. See David Kravets, Surveillance Strategy Is ‘Privileged and 
Confidential,’ FBI Says, WIRED.COM (Jan. 16, 2013, 4:38 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/fbi-surveillance-strategy/ (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2013) (discussing FBI’s assertion that cellphone location data does not 
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore can be obtained without 
a warrant based on probable cause) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 65. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272 
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 66. Id. § 215. Other post-9/11 statutes also relaxed limits on the use of 
investigative tactics. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified in scattered sections of 
U.S.C.) (extending authority to collect electronic communications under FISA to 
“lone wolf” terrorists—individuals engaged in terrorist activities but not 
connected to an international terrorist organization); FISA Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881, 1812, 
1885) (expanding authority to collect electronic communications under FISA to 
targets “reasonably believed to be outside the United States” without any 
showing of probable cause or particularized suspicion). 
 67. See Greenwald, supra note 1 (discussing a court order that “compels 
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In addition to the obvious privacy concerns raised by these 
rules, Professor Daniel Solove has also pointed out the potential 
for chill to First Amendment-protected activity when the FBI is 
engaged in widespread intelligence-gathering activities such as 
acquisition of internet search history; book purchases; phone call 
or email records; banking records; questioning an individual’s 
friends, neighbors, or colleagues; infiltrating religious or political 
gatherings; or using ISPs to identify individuals writing 
anonymous political blogs.68 Indeed, there is evidence that the 
FBI’s tactics have had this very effect in Muslim communities, 
where there is evidence of chill on attendance at political 
demonstrations, donations to political causes, speaking out 
against U.S. foreign policy, participating in community 
organizations, internet use, and book purchase habits.69  
Law enforcement surveillance of antiwar protesters and 
other political dissenters raises similar concerns about expressive 
and associational activities. A 2010 Justice Department review 
found that investigations of Greenpeace, People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, and antiwar groups used “troubling” 
tactics.70 In the course of these investigations, the FBI classified 
nonviolent civil disobedience as “acts of terrorism,” extended 
investigations “without adequate basis,” and unnecessarily placed 
several Greenpeace members on federal watch lists.71 Members of 
similarly situated groups may harbor concerns that their political 
activities will attract government attention, the result of which 
                                                                                                     
Verizon to produce to the NSA electronic copies of ‘all call detail records or 
“telephony metadata” created by Verizon for communications between the 
United States and abroad’ or ‘wholly within the United States, including local 
telephone calls’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 68. See Solove, supra note 38, at 151–76 (discussing the First Amendment 
implications of modern intelligence gathering). 
 69. See Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 7, at 69–71 
(discussing the chilling effects on the Muslim community caused by law 
enforcement actions). 
 70. Richard A. Serrano, FBI Improperly Investigated Activities, Justice 
Department Review Finds, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/21/nation/la-na-fbi-activists-20100921 (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 71. Id. 
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could be inclusion on a watch-list or even becoming the target of 
an investigation. 
The FBI’s aggressive investigation and infiltration of houses 
of worship can also chill the exercise of religious freedoms.72 As a 
result of the FBI’s use of undercover agents or informants in 
mosques, Muslim leaders across the country have reported “a 
reduction in attendance at mosques, a change in the language 
used at worship services, a decrease in contributions to Muslim 
charities, and an erosion of the trust and good will that are 
essential to the vitality of a religious community.”73 Studies have 
also shown that these tactics have also deterred members of the 
Muslim community from wearing clothing that expresses 
religious or cultural identities.74 
                                                                                                     
 72. Reports suggest that the DIOG requires a Special Operations Review 
Committee (SORC) to approve surveillance inside mosques. See Jessica 
Chasmar, Mosques Off-Limits by Government Snooping Since 2011, IBD 
Editorial Says, WASH. TIMES (June 13, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2013/jun/13/mosques-limits-government-snooping-2011-ibd-editor/ (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2013) (discussing the intersection of FBI intelligence-gathering 
and religious observation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
But the rules regarding undisclosed participation in political and religious 
events are redacted from the public version of the DIOG pursuant to FOIA’s 
exemption for law enforcement material, as are the provisions regarding the 
responsibilities and makeup of the SORC. See DIOG, supra note 12, §§ 16, 
18.5.5.3, 18.6 (describing undisclosed participation procedures, the fact that the 
FBI should use the least intrusive method possible, and the authorized 
investigation methods used in preliminary investigations); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7)(E) (2012) (exempting from disclosure information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes “if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law”). 
 73. Lininger, supra note 36, at 1233–34 (citations omitted); Fisher, supra 
note 38, at 647–49 (“The chilling of protected expression that accompanies 
political surveillance impedes the group’s ability to realize fully its political or 
religious purposes.”); see also Int’l Religious Freedom Report, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations, House Int’l Relations Comm., 108th Cong. 67 
(2002) (statement of Nihad Awad, Exec. Dir. of Council on American-Islamic 
Relations) (stating that at least three Muslim charities “have been effectively 
shut down”). Impediments to charitable giving interfere with Muslims’ ability to 
practice the Islamic duty of zakat (alms giving). See id. at 67–68 (“These 
closures [of Muslim charities] have had a wide impact . . . . Donors view such 
organizations as essential to the ability of Muslims to practice the religious duty 
of zakat (alms giving), a pillar of their faith.”). 
 74. See Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 7, at 69–71 
(detailing evidence that members of the Muslim Community refrain from 
expressing their religious or cultural identities). 
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Any of these intelligence-collection tactics may also be 
discriminatorily implemented, disproportionately burdening 
particular minorities. The use of unpredicated investigations in 
particular opens the door to investigative decisions based on the 
use of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. Historically, 
when law enforcement officials have been permitted to collect 
intelligence on groups and individuals suspected—without any 
objective basis—of harboring ill will toward the United States, 
the burden of that investigative activity has fallen on groups that 
espouse disfavored ideologies, minorities, or others who are 
perceived as threatening.75 
The more specific DIOG rules magnify concerns about 
discriminatory implementation. Under the DIOG, the FBI may 
collect information regarding ethnic and racial behaviors 
“reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal 
or terrorist element of an ethnic community.”76 Official 
expressions regarding how individuals become “radicalized” 
actually identify certain religious activities—such as Muslim men 
growing beards—as potential precursors to violent extremism, 
thus providing theoretical grounds for investigative decisions 
based at least in part on exactly these types of activities.77  
Investigative activity based in part on racial or ethnic 
characteristics is not limited to scrutiny of individuals. FBI policy 
also embraces “community mapping”—the practice of collecting 
and storing information about particular ethnic communities.78 
                                                                                                     
 75. The Supreme Court has noted that protections against intrusive 
surveillance “become the more necessary when the targets of official 
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs.” 
United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972). 
 76. DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.3.3.2.4. 
 77. See Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Radicalization Theory, 2 DUKE F.L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 39, 46–47 (2010) (“The ‘typical signatures’ of the pre-radicalization 
phase, for example are . . . ‘[w]earing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a 
beard’; and ‘[b]ecoming involved in social activism and community issues.’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y. 
POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 31 (2d ed. 
2009))). But see MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL., COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, 
MACLC’S CRITIQUE OF THE NYPD’S REPORT ON HOMEGROWN RADICALISM 6−7 
(2008), http://maclcnypdcritique.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/counterterrorism-
policy-final-paper3.pdf (critiquing the NYPD’s position). 
 78. See DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.3.3.2.2 (“[I]f information about community 
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The rules “permit the FBI to identify locations of concentrated 
ethnic communities” as well as to collect “the locations of ethnic-
oriented businesses and other facilities” (including religious 
facilities such as mosques) because “members of certain terrorist 
organizations live and operate primarily within a certain 
concentrated community of the same ethnicity.”79 The DIOG 
justifies such activity by asserting that concentrations of certain 
ethnic communities provide an opportunity for “identified 
terrorist subjects from certain countries [to] relocate to blend in 
and avoid detection.”80 Under these authorities, the FBI has 
collected information about religious, ethnic, and national-origin 
characteristics of American communities, identifying “Arab-
American and Muslim communities in Michigan as a potential 
terrorist recruitment ground” as well as noting “an increase in 
the African-American population of Georgia when analyzing 
                                                                                                     
demographics may be collected, it may be ‘mapped.’ Sophisticated computer geo-
mapping technology visually depicts lawfully collected information and can 
assist in showing relationships among disparate data.”).  
 79. Id. § 4.3.3.2.1. This same idea was proposed by local law enforcement 
authorities in Los Angeles but ultimately abandoned when the Muslim and civil 
liberties communities noted that it was likely to alienate Muslim residents. See 
Richard Winton et al., LAPD to Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/09/local/me-lapd9 (last visited Nov. 
13, 2013) (discussing the proposal and its demise) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim 
Mapping Plan Killed, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2007), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2007/nov/15/local/me-muslim15 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (same) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Reports that the NYPD has 
engaged in similar practices with respect to Muslim communities in New York 
have sparked significant controversy. See, e.g., Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, 
NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 21, 
2012), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spying-
led-to-no-leads-terror-cases (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (“The Demographics 
Unit is at the heart of a police spying program, built with help from the CIA, 
which assembled databases on where Muslims lived, shopped, worked and 
prayed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Rocco 
Parascandola, et al., NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly Defends Police Spying 
on Muslims, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/nypd-commissioner-raymond-kelly-defends-police-spying-muslims-article-
1.1029190 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (“[C]ops . . . watch[ed] Muslim 
neighborhoods and bought . . . computers they used to store reams of 
information about innocent Muslim college students, mosque sermons and social 
events . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.3.3.2.1. 
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‘Black Separatist’ groups,” pointing to Chinese and Russian 
communities in San Francisco “as a place to look for organized 
crime syndicates,” and “highlighted Latino communities as 
potentially harboring the Central American gang MS-13.”81 
The Guidelines are not blind to the concerns these tactics 
raise. In fact, they bar the FBI from initiating investigations into 
U.S. persons “solely for the purpose of monitoring activities 
protected by the First Amendment.”82 Nor may the Bureau 
“predicat[e] an investigation simply based on somebody’s race.”83 
But the Guidelines as well as the DIOG prevent such activity 
only when it is motivated solely by the desire to monitor First 
Amendment-protected activities, or by race, religion, or national 
origin.84 Investigative activity prompted in part by these factors 
is not barred.85 Individuals thus can be singled out for scrutiny 
due, at least in part, to their political or religious expressions, 
                                                                                                     
 81. Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Scrutinized for Amassing Data on American 
Communities, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/21/us/aclu-releases-fbi-documents-on-american-communities.html?_r=0 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.C.3. 
 83. Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Remarks Prepared for 
Delivery by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey at the Oregon Anti-
Terrorism Conference & Training (Aug. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Mukasey Speech], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-
0808133.html. 
 84. See, e.g., MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.C.3 (“These 
Guidelines do not authorize investigating or collecting or maintaining 
information . . . solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the 
First Amendment . . . .”); DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.2 (“[I]nvestigative activity 
may not be based solely on the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment . . . .”). 
 85. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in 
Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 842 (2011) (“[L]aw enforcement 
and prosecutors turn to religious speech as a signal of terrorist risk.”). Note also 
that after the Supreme Court decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
any speech undertaken in coordination with a designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) is criminal. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 
2705, 2730 (2010) (“We hold that, in regulating the particular forms of support 
that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations [through 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B], Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the 
limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.”). Thus, any indication that an 
individual supports an FTO or its political positions could trigger government 
scrutiny. 
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activities, or associations. This profiling on the basis of “national 
origin plus” could expose a large population of innocent persons to 
FBI scrutiny. Indeed, as law enforcement officials told the 
Associated Press, “[a]mong the factors that could make someone 
the subject of an investigation is travel to regions of the world 
known for terrorist activity . . . along with the person’s race or 
ethnicity.”86 Thus, every individual of Pakistani origin who 
travels to Pakistan to visit family is conceivably at risk of being 
subjected to FBI investigation merely on that basis.  
A final notable modification to the Guidelines implemented 
in 2008 was the elimination of the vast majority of oversight 
provisions contained in prior iterations of the Guidelines—time 
limits on investigations, the need to obtain supervisory approval, 
requirements to report regularly to FBI Headquarters or the 
Justice Department.87 Instead, these restrictions have been 
relegated to the DIOG, thereby empowering the FBI to determine 
the scope of its own power in this regard.88 Indeed, the DIOG may 
be changed whenever the FBI—not the Attorney General—
determines that it should be (as it was in 201189), and FBI 
                                                                                                     
 86. Lara Jakes Jordan, AP Impact: Race Profiling Eyed for Terror Probes, 
USA TODAY (July 2, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/ 
2008-07-02-926742133_x.htm. (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II (“These Guidelines do not 
impose supervisory approval requirements in assessments . . . .”); id. § II.B.2 
(providing that “a predicated investigation requires supervisory approval” only 
if “relating to foreign intelligence”); id. § II.B.5 (requiring FBI Headquarters be 
notified of predicated investigations only in limited instances); id. (imposing no 
limits on the duration of investigations). 
 88. See DIOG, supra note 12, §§ 3.4, 18 (setting supervisory approval 
requirements, placing time limits on some investigations, and requiring periodic 
reviews for all investigations); id. § 10 (increasing oversight for “sensitive 
investigative matters,” such as investigations of politicians, political or religious 
organizations, or members of the news media). 
 89. The 2011 changes to the DIOG loosened some existing restrictions. The 
DIOG now authorizes a number of investigative techniques even before opening 
an assessment, such as accessing information in the databases of federal, local, 
or state governments; interviewing a “complainant”; and searching publicly 
available information (including social media sites). See Charlie Savage, F.B.I. 
Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, (June 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/us/13fbi.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) 
(“The new rules add to several measures taken over the past decade to give 
agents more latitude as they search for signs of criminal or terrorist activity.”) 
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leadership can authorize departures from the DIOG’s 
requirements.90  
There may have been good reason for some of these changes. 
Indeed, some of them were the result of recommendations made 
by the 9/11 Commission to improve America’s counterterrorism 
capacity.91 There have, after all, been significant changes since 
1976—in the threats that we face, in the need for intelligence 
gathering, in Americans’ expectations of what their government 
should do to protect them and their interests. The limits on FBI 
intelligence activities imposed in the 1970s, however, reflected 
concerns expressed by the legislature and the public.92 The 
current Guidelines, by contrast, have fundamentally transformed 
the role of America’s primary domestic federal law enforcement 
agency with almost no public debate and with no legislative 
action.93 Thus, regardless of what one thinks about the propriety 
of the changes themselves, we might question the adequacy of the 
process leading to such a transformation. 
B. Existing Failures of Intelligence-Collection Governance 
If the FBI’s intelligence-collection authorities do not run 
afoul of existing legal limits, why is the way in which they are 
governed a cause for concern? Because despite these authorities’ 
                                                                                                     
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 90. See DIOG, supra note 12, § 2.7.2 (providing the authorization to depart 
from DIOG procedures). Such departures must not violate the Guidelines 
themselves. Id. 
 91. See Jordan, supra note 86 (“Law enforcement officials say the proposed 
policy would help them do exactly what Congress demanded after the Sept. 11, 
2001, attacks: root out terrorists before they strike.”). 
 92. See Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Church Committee, Then and 
Now, in U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY 25 (Russell A. 
Miller ed., 2008) (“Attorney General Edward Levi and President Gerald Ford, 
followed by President Jimmy Carter, had issued guidelines and executive orders 
in response to the Church Committee’s revelations that went part of the way 
toward the goals of the Church Committee.”). 
 93. See Dalal, supra note 39, at 14–24 (discussing the “steady unmooring of 
the Attorney General Guidelines from the rights-protecting framework 
enshrined in 1976”). 
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undisputed implications for civil liberties94—indeed, their 
tendency to result in civil liberties infringements is what inspired 
the implementation of the Guidelines in the first instance—they 
are untouched by the nondoctrinal constraints that usually 
accompany law enforcement activities. This means that the only 
constraints on the FBI’s intelligence-collection powers are the 
internal rules the Justice Department and the FBI have imposed 
on themselves.  
Several inherent differences between intelligence collection 
and crime-solving investigations account for the inapplicability of 
constraints that usually limit government action. First, the very 
nature of the intelligence-collection enterprise is inherently more 
expansive in scope—proactive rather than reactive and less 
narrowly targeted.95 Consequently, practical constraints that 
usually serve to limit law enforcement agencies’ activities—
resource limitations and a focus on solving individual crimes—are 
inapplicable. Second, the secretive nature of intelligence-
collection activities renders them effectively immune to judicial 
review as well as scrutiny from the legislature and the public.96 
And third, the Justice Department and the FBI generate the 
Guidelines and the DIOG in the context of the FBI’s post-9/11 
focus on terrorism prevention.97 This means that the rules are 
crafted by government officials with security and intelligence-
collection expertise. There are, therefore, no structural checks to 
remove from the hands of security technocrats the normative 
judgments that must be made about the relative importance of 
                                                                                                     
 94. See Schwarz, supra note 92, at 25 (noting the uneasy truce between the 
FBI’s authority and civil liberty). 
 95. See ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § III.B.2 (“The immediate 
purpose of a terrorism enterprise investigation is to obtain information 
concerning the nature and structure of the enterprise . . . with a view to the 
longer range objectives of detection, prevention, and prosecution of the criminal 
activities of the enterprise.”). 
 96. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 655 
(6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the state secrets doctrine would prevent discovery of 
whether plaintiffs were actually wiretapped). 
 97. See FBI, QUICK FACTS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (listing “[p]rotect[ing] the United States from terrorist 
attack[s]” as the FBI’s number one priority) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Law Review). 
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aggressive intelligence collection and rights protections.98 The 
result is that, despite the fact that intelligence collection 
implicates important values, the only constraints on that 
collection are effectively self-imposed. 
1. Intelligence Collection and Practical Constraints 
Intelligence collection compliments and overlaps with 
criminal investigation, but it is a distinct endeavor. Crime-solving 
efforts are tied to individual cases. They focus on the 
investigations of specific acts in an effort to collect evidence 
related to each element of a completed or impending crime, and 
tend to end with a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute.99 As 
previous versions of the Guidelines recognize, criminal 
investigations are more circumscribed in scope and tend to be 
shorter in duration than intelligence investigations.100 
Intelligence investigations, by contrast, call for much different—
and much broader—investigative activities, which “may continue 
for several years.”101 Furthermore, the focus of such 
investigations “‘may be less precise than that directed against 
more conventional types of crime. . . . For this reason the 
investigation is broader and less discriminate than usual,’”102 
seeking information about potential targets as well as criminal or 
terrorist organizations, their members, their goals, and their 
sources of funding.103 Thus, the goal of intelligence collection is to 
gather as much information as possible for future analysis, rather 
than seeking only information connected to a discrete incident.  
                                                                                                     
 98. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the deficiencies of administrative self-
governance).  
 99. See ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § III (“As a general rule, an 
investigation of a completed criminal act is normally confined to determining 
who committed that act and securing evidence to establish the elements of the 
particular offense.”). 
 100. See, e.g., id. § III (recognizing the difference between criminal and 
intelligence investigations). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972)). 
 103. Id. § III.B.3. 
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A law enforcement agency focused on crime solving is less 
likely to allocate time and resources to the types of activities 
currently taking place under the Guidelines. While that agency 
may be permitted, for example, to place an individual under 
twenty-four-hour surveillance or attend political rallies,104 it is 
unlikely to devote scarce manpower to such activities if there is 
no factual basis for doing so.105 If an agency’s primary goal, 
however, is to collect as much information as possible to include 
in a database because it is impossible to know what information 
might eventually lead to the prevention of a threat or crime, then 
its ability to engage in that collection will be supported by 
sufficient funds and manpower. Recent technological advances 
exacerbate this phenomenon because they have made the 
collection and storage of information infinitely cheaper and easier 
than ever before.106  
In order to ensure that the FBI engages in the broad 
investigative activities associated with intelligence collection, the 
Guidelines—initially imposed to restrict domestic intelligence 
collection—have been transformed into Guidelines expressly 
facilitating and encouraging such activity. They remind agents 
that they “cannot be content to wait for leads to come through the 
action of others” and thus “must proactively draw on available 
sources of information.”107 In so doing, they both expand the FBI’s 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. § II.B(5)(b), (6)(g) (authorizing the use of nonconsensual 
electronic surveillance, physical or photographic surveillance, or any other 
investigative technique covered under chapter 119 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code). 
 105. See id. § II.C(1) (“A general crimes investigation may be initiated by the 
FBI when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has 
been, is being, or will be committed.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: 
A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1013–15 (2010) (recognizing that 
the digital storage of data means that unlimited data, which can be located 
anywhere, can be made available to the government); Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board, Workshop Regarding Surveillance Programs 
Operated Pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Transcript at 300 (July 9, 2013) 
(statement of Greg Nojeim, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.), http://www. 
pclob.gov/SiteAssets/9-july-2013/Public%20Workshop%20-%20Full.pdf (noting 
that “something has to substitute for the friction that used to be in the system 
because there wasn’t an ability to collect all this information about all human 
interaction . . . that we have now”). 
 107. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § II.  
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authorized powers and relax the limits on how those powers may 
be used. Because they will be utilized far more expansively than 
their crime-solving counterparts, which existing doctrine evolved 
to regulate, the FBI’s powers present a greater threat to 
fundamental values than existing doctrine may indicate. 
2. Intelligence Collection and Judicial or Political Constraints 
In engaging in the broad intelligence-collection activities 
envisioned by the Guidelines, the FBI will elude traditional 
checks on power, such as judicial review and congressional or 
public oversight. The result is that the Guidelines and their 
implementation lack both the accountability and the democratic 
legitimacy that usually accompanies government policy.108  
There are several obstacles to judicial review of the 
Guidelines and the activities undertaken pursuant to them. As an 
initial matter, the Guidelines themselves disclaim any intention 
to create enforceable rights, so any action taken pursuant to them 
can be challenged only if it is otherwise unlawful.109 In addition, 
the secrecy of these activities ensures that individuals who seek 
to challenge intelligence-collection regimes will struggle to 
demonstrate a sufficiently concrete injury to establish standing to 
sue.110 Surveillance tactics are designed to prevent targets from 
being alerted to the fact that law enforcement is gathering 
information about them, so it is difficult to point to specific 
government action causing harm.111 Moreover, courts have held 
                                                                                                     
 108. See infra notes 121–138 and accompanying text.  
 109. See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.D.2 (“The[se guidelines] 
are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any matter, civil 
or criminal . . . .”). 
 110. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
(“[S]tanding . . . [requires the plaintiff to suffer an] ‘injury in fact’—an invasion 
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and 
(b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”’” (footnote omitted) 
(citations omitted)). 
 111. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (2012) (imposing gag orders on entities 
receiving requests for information from the FBI); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (allowing 
law enforcement to delay warrant notice requirements under certain 
circumstances); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 596 (“[I]ndividuals who allegedly are 
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that neither allegations of general chill nor an “objectively 
reasonable likelihood” that a plaintiffs’ communications will be 
subject to surveillance are sufficient.112 Thus, standing remains a 
bar to the courthouse door. 
Another barrier that has proved fatal to judicial review of 
intelligence collection is the state secrets privilege,113 which 
allows the government to withhold evidence whose disclosure 
might endanger national security.114 At times the privilege 
results in a case being dismissed outright.115 In other instances, a 
                                                                                                     
being spied on illegally tend to be unaware of that fact. . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 112. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013) 
(“Because respondents do not face a threat of certainly impending interception 
under § 1881a, the costs that they have incurred to avoid surveillance are 
simply the product of their fear of surveillance . . . [this] is insufficient to create 
standing.” (footnote omitted)); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) 
(“Allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of 
specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm; ‘the federal 
courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render 
advisory opinions.’” (quoting United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 
330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947))); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 
F.3d 644, 660 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting the “subjective chill” language from 
Laird); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 596 (“[I]f certain individuals have some basis for 
thinking that they have been the subjects of illegal surveillance, they are often 
unable to make . . . [a] definitive showing of injury . . . for constitutional 
standing.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 113. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (dismissing foreign nationals’ claims of harm caused by the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program pursuant to the 
state secrets doctrine); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 
2007) (dismissing a foreign national’s claim of harm caused by the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program pursuant to the state 
secrets doctrine); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 
655 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the state secrets doctrine would prevent 
discovery of whether plaintiffs were actually wiretapped); Fazaga v. FBI, 884 F. 
Supp. 2d 1022, 1049  (C.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing claims that the FBI illegally 
directed agents to gather information on Southern California Muslim 
Communities pursuant to the state secrets doctrine); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 
596 (“[E]ven if [a plaintiff has standing], the government is free to invoke the 
state secrets privilege and, in effect, unilaterally have the case dismissed . . . .”). 
 114. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953) (“[T]he privilege 
against revealing military secrets . . . is well established in the law of evidence.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 115. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing foreign nationals’ claims of harm caused by 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program pursuant to 
the state secrets doctrine). 
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suit may proceed with evidence that the government is willing to 
share only ex parte,116 undermining the proceedings’ adversarial 
nature. 
The government’s investigative actions are most frequently 
scrutinized through motions to suppress evidence collected in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.117 But this process generally 
eludes the targets of surveillance. When the government gathers 
information for the purposes of criminal prosecution and seeks to 
introduce it as evidence at trial, only the individual about whom 
the information was gathered—the criminal defendant—will have 
the opportunity to challenge the government’s actions through a 
suppression motion.118 This means that these practices will face 
challenges in those circumstances where the government’s case is 
most compelling—when a guilty person seeks to exclude 
probative inculpatory evidence.119 Moreover, much of the 
government’s intelligence-collection activity never leads to 
prosecution. As a result, innocent targets of surveillance—those 
whose information is collected because it is deemed “relevant” to 
an investigation, or members of a house of worship who change 
their religious practices due to fear of surveillance—will be 
unable to invoke judicial protection.120 
The accountability gap left by the absence of judicial review 
will not be filled by legislative or public scrutiny. The origin story 
of the original Attorney General Guidelines included a significant 
role for Congress.121 Having been prompted by the Church 
                                                                                                     
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179, 183–84 (D.D.C. 1979) 
(concluding that in camera, ex-parte review of documents obtained by the FBI 
from foreign intelligence sources was appropriate). 
 117. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h) (providing the ability to file a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).  
 118. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[S]tanding to 
invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the 
Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the 
unlawful search.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757, 796–97 (1994) (“Under the exclusionary rule, the more guilty 
you are, the more you benefit.”). 
 120. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (discussing who may challenge 
government surveillance tactics). 
 121. See Schwarz, supra note 92, at 25 (noting early legislative involvement 
in the Guidelines). 
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Committee’s findings of misconduct and the resulting public 
outrage, the legislature was intimately involved in developing the 
contents of the Guidelines.122 Congress held a series of hearings 
on the issue over the course of several years, and saw its 
suggestions ultimately reflected in the Levi Guidelines.123 Given 
that the Guidelines were implemented, at least in part, to avoid 
more stringent legislative action,124 this is not a surprise. Surely 
Attorney General Levi knew that if the rules he instituted did not 
appear to address Congress’s concerns, they would fail to sap the 
momentum for enacting a statutory charter for the FBI.  
The contemporary political economy of congressional 
oversight in this area means that legislative oversight will not 
provide any more effective a check than judicial action. 
Legislators’ incentives weigh against aggressive involvement. The 
downside risks of unsuccessful counterterrorism policies 
(additional attacks) are high.125 If those policies are developed 
outside of the legislative process, Congress can share (if not 
entirely evade) blame. Moreover, counterterrorism policy “is a 
subject matter that is especially prone to legislative delegation 
because it often entails hard trade-offs,” which are the types of 
questions Congress is least likely to address.126 In addition to 
undermining legislative involvement in counterterrorism policy 
formulation, existing institutional features also render 
                                                                                                     
 122. See FBI Statutory Charter Part 1, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 3–35 (1978) [hereinafter FBI Statutory Charter Part 1] 
(questioning the Attorney General about the content of the Guidelines).  
 123. See, e.g., id. at 1–3 (voicing concerns about illegal FBI activities); FBI 
Statutory Charter Part 2, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & 
Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 3−4 (1978) (voicing 
concerns about undercover FBI operations); Schwarz, supra note 92, at 25 
(“Attorney General Edward Levi . . . issued guidelines and executive orders in 
response to the Church Committee’s revelations that went part of the way 
toward the goals of the Church Committee.”). 
 124. See FBI Statutory Charter Part 1, supra note 122, at 25 (noting that the 
Guidelines were prompted by the Church Committee’s findings and sought to 
avoid drastic legislative action). 
 125. Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 887, 921 (2002) (“Errors on the security side are more likely to be 
widespread, affecting many people and imposing a high political cost.”). 
 126. See id. at 923 (“[L]egislators will tend . . . to delegate decisions rather 
than . . . resolve hard questions themselves.”). 
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congressional oversight of domestic intelligence-collection policy 
ineffectual. Congress, of course, retains oversight authority over 
the FBI.127 If it wants to play a more active role in overseeing the 
Guidelines, it has the tools to do so.128 After all, Congress 
determines whether and to what degree the FBI’s intelligence-
collection activities are funded.129 Moreover, the relevant 
committees of jurisdiction conduct regular oversight hearings at 
which the Attorney General and FBI Director appear.130 
Legislators can ask Justice Department and FBI officials for 
information about the Guidelines or the FBI’s activities at any 
time.131 
Perhaps as a result of the existing incentive structure, 
however, Congress has shown little appetite to pursue 
Guidelines-related issues of late.132 The most recent modification 
to the Guidelines, for example, failed to reflect congressional 
input. The Justice Department provided the Senate Judiciary 
                                                                                                     
 127. See U.S.H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, ABOUT, 
HISTORY AND JURISDICTION, http://intelligence.house.gov/about/history-
jurisdiction (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“The HPSCI is charged with the 
oversight of the United States Intelligence Community, which includes the 
intelligence and intelligence related activities of 17 elements of the U.S. 
Government, and the Military Intelligence Program.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); ABOUT U.S.S. SELECT COMM. ON 
INTELLIGENCE, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 
29, 2013) (“The Committee meets roughly twice a week for 1 1/2 to 2 hours, 
generally in closed session. Most hearings involve appearances by senior 
Intelligence Community officials . . . who present testimony and answer 
Senators’ questions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative power in Congress); id. 
art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (vesting the House of Representatives with the power to impeach 
public officials); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (vesting the Senate with the power to try all 
impeachments); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing the spending power). 
 129. See U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing the spending power). 
 130. See, e.g., FBI Oversight, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY, http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program/FBIOver (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (documenting FBI 
Director Robert Mueller’s testimony at an FBI oversight hearing before the 
House Judiciary Committee on June 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 131. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“[T]he power of 
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to 
the legislative function.”). 
 132. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 597–98 (providing possible reasons why 
congressional oversight of intelligence collection lacks “vitality”). 
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Committee a completed draft of the Mukasey Guidelines a few 
months before they were implemented.133 A handful of senators 
requested that Attorney General Mukasey delay their 
implementation until Congress had the opportunity to develop 
suggestions regarding ways to minimize civil liberties concerns.134 
Their request went unanswered. And even when FBI Director 
Robert Mueller III inaccurately testified in 2010 before Congress 
that the FBI did not have the authority to conduct unpredicated 
investigations, legislators took no follow-up action.135 
While Congress has shown little interest in scrutinizing the 
Guidelines, the public is not given a choice in the matter. Activity 
undertaken pursuant to the Guidelines is secret and therefore 
rarely apparent on its own or reported in sufficient detail in the 
news media.136 Moreover, information about how the Guidelines 
are used is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act on the basis of either the law enforcement or the 
classified-information exemption contained in that statute.137 The 
public also lacks means to scrutinize how the rules are 
                                                                                                     
 133. See Letter from Sens. Russell Feingold, Edward Kennedy, Richard 
Durbin, & Sheldon Whitehouse, to  Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/ 
Justice/20080820.Letter.from.Senators.to.AG.Mukasey.re.FBI.Guidelines.pdf 
(noting that a draft of the Mukasey Guidelines was made available to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee during August of 2008). 
 134. See id. (“Before you sign the guidelines, we urge you to make them 
available publicly, and to solicit input not only from members of Congress but 
also from national security and civil liberties experts . . . .”). 
 135. See Letter from Stephen Kelly, Asst. Dir., FBI Office of Cong. Affairs, to 
Sen. Richard J. Durbin (July 28, 2010), http://www.bordc.org/press/fbidurbin 
letter.pdf (alerting the Senator to the fact that the FBI Director “misspoke” 
when he asserted during an oversight hearing that there is “a requirement of 
‘suspicion of wrongdoing’ in order for the FBI to engage in surveillance of an 
individual or location”). 
 136. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (2012) (imposing gag orders on entities 
receiving requests for information from the FBI); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) (2012) 
(allowing law enforcement to delay warrant notice requirements under certain 
circumstances). 
 137. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012) (exempting information that “would 
disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law”). 
38 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2014) 
implemented. In some cases even the rules themselves are secret. 
The publicly available version of the DIOG, for example, entirely 
redacts the rules governing undisclosed participation in religious 
or political gatherings.138 
3. Intelligence Collection and Structural Constraints 
The governance concerns posed by the FBI’s intelligence-
focused mission and the lack of traditional oversight are 
compounded by the FBI’s tendency to emphasize that mission 
over other concerns. The Attorney General and the FBI are 
responsible for incorporating two sometimes conflicting 
responsibilities into intelligence-collection policies—terrorism 
prevention and civil liberties protection.139 Given the incentives to 
err on the side of security, the Guidelines risk short-changing 
civil liberties concerns when the two missions conflict. The FBI 
declares on its website that “[a]s an intelligence-driven and a 
threat-focused national security organization with both 
intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities,” its mission is 
to “to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and 
foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal 
laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal 
justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international 
agencies and partners.”140 Similarly, the Bureau identifies as its 
top priority protecting the United States from terrorist attack, 
followed by combatting foreign intelligence operations, 
cyberattacks, high-technology crimes, and public corruption.141  
                                                                                                     
 138. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. Even if these rules were 
public, the majority often lacks incentive to object to problematic provisions 
because much of the burden of intelligence collection falls on minority 
communities. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 88–179 (2003) (providing a 
discussion of the historical pattern of dealing with threats to national security 
by focusing on noncitizens with the rationale that they have diminished rights). 
 139. See supra Part II.A (discussing how the FBI’s policies affect the 
prevention of terrorist attacks and protecting civil liberties).  
 140. Quick Facts, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 141. Id. 
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In other words, despite its location in the Department of 
Justice and its law-enforcement responsibilities, the FBI is now 
primarily a national security and intelligence-focused agency.142 
In all of the FBI’s statements listing its goals and priorities, 
protecting civil liberties falls far below protecting against 
terrorist attacks and other security threats.143 Like the FBI’s 
other statements of its priorities, the post-9/11 Guidelines 
themselves present “[p]rotection of the United States and Its 
people” as the goal that the FBI’s investigative authorities are 
designed to further.144 And while the Guidelines have always 
explicitly required investigators to use the least intrusive method 
possible to achieve their investigative goals,145 as of 2002 the 
Guidelines include a caveat: agents should not “hesitate to use 
any lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines, even if 
intrusive,”146 where the degree of intrusiveness is warranted in 
light of the seriousness of a threat, or in light of the importance of 
foreign intelligence sought in the United States’ interests.147 This 
                                                                                                     
 142. See Hamed Aleaziz, Want to Sue the FBI for Spying on Your Mosque? 
Sorry, That’s Secret,” MOTHER JONES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.motherjones. 
com/politics/2011/08/state-secrets-fazaga-v-fbi (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) 
(quoting University of Texas Law Professor Bobby Chesney’s assertion that “[a]t 
the end of the day, the FBI is part of the intelligence community as well—it’s 
not necessarily thought of as any different than the NSA”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 143. See, e.g., Quick Facts, FBI, supra note 140 (listing civil rights protection 
as fifth on the FBI’s list of priorities); Intelligence Overview, FBI 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intel-driven/intelligence-overview (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (discussing “safeguarding civil liberties” last on the 
“Intelligence Overview” page) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 144. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § I.C.1. 
 145. Until 2002, the Guidelines instructed that inquiries and investigations 
should “be conducted with as little intrusion into the privacy of individuals as 
the needs of the situation permit.” Memorandum from Charles Doyle, Sr. 
Specialist, Am. Law Div., Cong. Research Serv., to Senate Select Comm. on 
Intelligence 13 (Sept. 22, 2008) (citations omitted) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 146. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § I. 
 147. See id. (instructing agents to balance the importance of the information 
sought with the intrusiveness of the techniques necessary). 
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point is to be observed in particular, agents are instructed, in 
investigations relating to terrorism.148  
The DIOG presents even larger concerns on this front. Those 
rules are devised and implemented within the FBI itself.149 Thus, 
any nonsecurity perspective that Justice Department officials 
may bring is absent from the DIOG. And because the terms of the 
Guidelines are relatively skeletal, the FBI is left to fill in most of 
the details itself. The DIOG does include hortatory language 
regarding the need to be solicitous of civil liberties; to refrain 
from infringing on First Amendment rights and from profiling on 
the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin; and to 
limit appropriately the scope and intrusiveness of FBI activity.150 
It also instructs that “when First Amendment rights are at stake, 
the choice and use of investigative methods should be focused in a 
manner that minimizes potential infringement of those rights.”151 
But after warning agents to take privacy, equal protection, and 
First Amendment rights into account, the DIOG concludes by 
reiterating that “FBI employees may use any lawful method 
allowed, even if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted 
by the threat to the national security or to potential victims of 
crime.”152 
A recent quote from former Director of National Intelligence 
Mike McConnell captures the sentiment of many security 
policymakers. In his view, the American people have “very little 
appreciation for the threat,” and “special interests, particularly 
civil liberty groups with privacy concerns,” prevent the 
intelligence community from doing its job as well as it otherwise 
could.153 This view of the need to consider privacy concerns as a 
                                                                                                     
 148. See id. § I.C.2. (providing particular guidance relating to terrorism). 
 149. See DIOG, supra note 12, Preamble (“To assist the FBI in its mission, 
the Attorney General signed [DIOG] on September 29, 2008. The primary 
purpose of the [DIOG] is to standardize policy so that . . . investigative activities 
are accomplished in a consistent manner.”).  
 150. See id. § 4.1.2 (barring the FBI from investigating solely to monitor the 
exercise of constitutional rights, such as the free exercise of speech, religion, 
assembly, press and petition” or based “solely on the race, ethnicity, national 
origin or religious beliefs” of the subject). 
 151. Id. § 4.4.4. 
 152. Id. § 4.4.5. 
 153. Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He 
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hurdle to effective policy, rather than as an integral part of 
policymaking, illustrates the tension that sometimes arises 
between the FBI’s primary mission and its responsibility to 
protect civil liberties. As others have pointed out, the FBI will 
value success in carrying out its primary mission and will favor 
terrorism prevention “over competing concerns such as the 
protection of civil liberties.”154  
Pointing out the elevation of the FBI’s anti-terrorism mission 
over other considerations is not meant to be an indictment. That 
mission is a vital one that should be pursued vigorously. And 
with over a century of experience conducting criminal and 
security investigations, the FBI is the agency in the best position 
to determine the most effective means of pursuing that mission. 
This includes decisions regarding which investigative methods 
will be most successful in countering threats to the country. This 
expertise should not be undervalued.  
At the same time, the decision about what level of 
intrusiveness society is prepared to accept in pursuit of security 
is not a matter of technical, investigative, or intelligence-
collection expertise. Determining the intrusiveness of an 
investigation justified by any particular set of circumstances 
necessarily involves normative judgments implicating 
fundamental values. As should now be clear however, the only 
true constraints on the FBI’s intelligence-collection activities are 
the Guidelines and the DIOG. This leaves decisions regarding the 
appropriate balance between the FBI’s security mission and the 
interests on the other side of the scale in the hands of the 
Attorney General. He, in turn, has delegated many of those 
                                                                                                     
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveil 
lance-data.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 154. Lininger, supra note 36, at 1267; see also Rory K. Little, Who Should 
Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 418–23 
(1996) (explaining the potential monetary and nonmonetary costs of a wholly 
preemptive ethics code generated by the Attorney General); Fred C. Zacharias, 
Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, or, Who Should 
Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 449 (1996) 
(“[T]he DOJ . . . is likely to allow institutional or membership interests to 
dominate its substantive value choices.”). 
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decisions to the FBI itself. Thus, concerns over security will have 
a prominent role in such decision making and other interests will 
be short-changed. 
III. Administrative Strategies as Governance 
If the usual tools of governance fail to apply effectively to the 
Guidelines and the DIOG, how do we devise mechanisms to fill 
this governance gap? This Part argues that we can borrow from 
the institutional design principles of the administrative state to 
address three specific challenges presented by the Guidelines 
regime. First, the absence of both doctrinal and practical limits 
on the FBI’s intelligence collection confers expansive discretion 
on the Attorney General and the FBI. Second, the lack of judicial, 
legislative, or public scrutiny of FBI policy results in a deficit of 
both accountability and democratic legitimacy. And third, the 
FBI’s focus on threat prevention creates a risk that its 
rulemaking decisions will give insufficient attention to liberty 
and privacy interests. With respect to each of these challenges, 
this Part identifies strategies the administrative state employs, 
and uses those strategies to develop concrete suggestions to 
improve intelligence-collection governance.  
This examination of administrative law strategies—designed 
to channel discretion, increase accountability and legitimacy, and 
ensure that competing priorities are afforded sufficient 
attention—suggests the following concrete reform proposals. 
First, a reason-giving framework should be implemented that 
(1) requires the Attorney General to provide notice of his or her 
intention to modify the Guidelines; and (2) specifies that any 
modifications must be justified in writing.155 Second, to promote 
meaningful pluralist input, the Attorney General should be 
obligated to consider as part of the Guidelines-development 
process the views of stakeholders outside the intelligence 
community (though not necessarily outside the government).156 
Third, in order to ensure liberty interests are not marginalized, 
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(1) the Justice Department should be required to prepare a 
statement indicating the likely impact on civil liberties of any 
changes to the Guidelines, and (2) the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board should be empowered to participate 
meaningfully in the Guidelines’ development.157 Before beginning 
the analysis that suggests these particular reforms, however, a 
few preliminary points are in order.  
A. Preliminary Questions 
This subpart will preemptively address several questions 
raised by the discussion that follows. First, it acknowledges (and 
rejects) concerns, based in political realities, that these proposals 
can be no more than a thought exercise. Then it clarifies the role 
that the Administrative Procedure Act plays in the argument, 
and finally it recognizes that the addition of procedural 
requirements may impose costs as well as benefits. With these 
first-order questions addressed (if not entirely resolved), the 
Article turns to the recommendations themselves.  
First, some brief thoughts on political economy. This Article 
aims to propose some plausible reforms in an area where what 
Professor Heather Gerken calls the “here to there” problem is a 
significant obstacle.158 Perhaps even more than in other policy 
areas, expectations that Congress will act to implement these 
recommendations—through legislation or through other available 
levers of power—are likely to be disappointed. Indeed, 
congressional oversight of national security policy has long been 
considered ineffective by government officials, outside task forces, 
and scholars.159 The dearth of public information about national 
                                                                                                     
 157. See infra Part III.D.  
 158. See Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 
1583–88 (2009) (discussing the difficulty of implementing reforms in the 
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security policy, which makes oversight significantly more 
challenging, is partially to blame.160 But there are also perverse 
incentives at work: legislators have no incentive to engage in 
aggressive oversight of intelligence-collection powers.161 
Legislators gain little by taking ownership over security policy.162 
Meanwhile, so long as Congress can label such policies 
“executive,” it cannot be blamed for intelligence failures.163 The 
result is that all electoral incentives point toward congressional 
deference to executive policy preferences in this area.164 This is 
                                                                                                     
legislators, and legislative staff interviewed by author] complained that 
oversight was nowhere close to meeting their expectations. And most believed 
that oversight was consistently ineffective and getting more so.”); Vicki Divoll, 
The “Full Access Doctrine”: Congress’s Constitutional Entitlement to National 
Security Information from the Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 539–41 
(2011) (arguing for intelligence oversight reform because “[f]orty years of 
tweaking the [existing] statutes has not worked”); Loch K. Johnson, Ostriches, 
Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians: Role Selection by Congressional 
Intelligence Overseers, 28 SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 93, 104–06 (2008) (calling on 
members of Congress to exercise more diligent intelligence oversight). 
 160. See AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, 
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information providers.”); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 597 n.81 (noting fire alarm 
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State? 21–30 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 10-53, 2010) (describing challenges to congressional 
oversight stemming from secrecy).   
 161. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1818–20 (2013) (explaining why the legislature is 
strategically disadvantaged in national security matters compared with the 
executive). 
 162. See id. at 1825–26 (“[L]egislators can derive scant electoral rewards 
from associating themselves with particular counterterrorism policy . . . .”). 
 163. See id. at 1826 (“Since counterterrorism legislation provides small 
upside value and enormous downside risk, legislators are best served, 
electorally, by ensuring that any catastrophe cannot be laid at their feet through 
voting in . . . a ‘pro-security’ direction.”). 
 164. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, 
POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 12 (2008) (noting that in both the United States and 
Britain, legislators lacking full information about the nature and scope of the 
threat will “err on the side of caution”); JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND 
CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 92 (2012) (“Members [of 
congressional intelligence committees] tend not to like responsibility for 
national security decisions.”); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL 
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especially so for intelligence-collection policies imposing 
disproportionate impact on certain segments of society, such as 
minorities or noncitizens, whose interests carry little electoral 
weight with legislators.165 Expectations that Congress will take 
action in this area are thus likely to be disappointed.  
And if Congress is so impotent with respect to the oversight 
of the Guidelines, what would prompt either Congress or the 
executive branch to impose the types of restrictions proposed 
here? While I do not want to minimize the challenges of 
prompting government actors to impose restrictions on domestic 
security measures, opportunities for reform do arise. My hope is 
to generate a menu of possible options, so that when such an 
opportunity presents itself, it may be exploited.  
These opportunities will likely arise out of one of two possible 
exogenous events. First, there could be an event that triggers 
widespread public concern about the FBI’s activities and places 
sufficient pressure on Congress, or the Attorney General, or the 
President that they have to take some action. After all, the 
revelations about the activities of COINTELPRO are exactly 
what brought the Attorney General’s Guidelines into existence.166 
And the recent revelations regarding the NSA promise to prompt 
a series of policy changes.  The second possible event is a judicial 
decision invalidating a particular FBI policy. Such a decision is 
more likely to lead to modifications to particular practices—such 
as we saw when a court rejected as unconstitutional the provision 
that barred National Security Letter recipients from disclosing to 
anyone that they had received one167—rather than to a broad 
procedural framework. But like a scandal, judicial invalidation of 
certain FBI activities could spur a broader reform effort.  
                                                                                                     
ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 58 (2004) (“[T]he political costs of underreaction are 
always going to be higher than the costs of overreaction.”); ZEGART, supra note 
160, at 35 (“What member would be willing to risk the charge that his oversight 
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national security interest?”); Berman, supra note 161, at 1825–26 (explaining 
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matters).  
 165. See COLE, supra note 138, at 88–179 (providing examples). 
 166. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.   
 167. See John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876–81 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(concluding the nondisclosure requirement could not survive strict scrutiny). 
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Given the appropriate political environment, there are at 
least three reasons to think that the imposition of a framework 
like the one suggested here is not entirely implausible. As an 
initial matter, there is the FBI’s concern over legitimacy. The 
Bureau’s ability to succeed in its mission requires constructive 
relationships with the communities in which it operates.168 Yet its 
aggressive intelligence-collection tactics—and their concentration 
in Muslim communities—has alienated many members of that 
community, raised suspicion and distrust of the Bureau in some 
quarters, and undermined cooperative relationships.169 Improved 
governance is thus not the only benefit that would flow from 
implementing APA-like procedures; institutionalizing rulemaking 
procedures would also yield improvements in community 
relations, public perceptions of legitimacy, and consequently, FBI 
effectiveness. In addition, government documents and scholarly 
commentary are replete with arguments about the value of 
process in legitimating government action.170 The FBI’s practice 
of reaching out to nongovernmental organizations in anticipation 
of issuing new intelligence-collection rules indicates an 
awareness of the benefits of generating the support of outside 
stakeholders.171 Subjecting itself to a set of procedural rules 
would go far in this regard. And finally, none of the proposals 
here are substantive. They do not call upon the FBI to cede any 
particular powers, or to discontinue existing policy. Indeed, they 
acknowledge the Attorney General’s and FBI’s role in generating 
the rules by which the FBI operates, so long as they can show 
                                                                                                     
 168. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 32, at 34–35 (explaining the importance of 
community-provided information in FBI counterterrorism efforts). 
 169. See, e.g., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, TARGETED & 
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 171. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 32, at 43 n.286 (“The Justice Department 
gave the illusion, though without any substance, of consultation with 
stakeholders before implementing the current guidelines.”). 
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both that changes in the FBI’s authority are needed and that the 
proposed changes are reasonable ones. And finally, when it comes 
to imposing limits on government actors, broad procedural 
frameworks often face less opposition than substantive policy 
changes.172  
A second preliminary note concerns the role of the APA. 
While several of the proposed reforms are inspired by provisions 
of the APA, this Article does not argue that the APA’s procedural 
rules apply to the FBI as a matter of binding law.173 In fact, it 
does not take a position with respect to whether the Guidelines or 
the DIOG constitute legislative rules subject to APA 
requirements, or whether they represent informal guidance 
documents or “rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice,” which are explicitly exempt from many of the APA’s 
constraints.174 Instead, the Article looks to the way the APA and 
other sources of administrative law address particular concerns 
and argues that intelligence-collection governance would benefit 
from implementing procedures inspired the animating principles 
behind these sources of administrative law. 
The idea of imposing a governance framework on the 
development of rules in the absence of a statutory requirement to 
do so is not a novel one. The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB)—part of the Executive Office of the President tasked with 
overseeing the regulatory decisions of administrative 
agencies175—in its Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance 
Practices “establishes policies and procedures for the 
development, issuance, and use of significant guidance 
                                                                                                     
 172. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2323 (2006) 
(“[S]ometimes broad design choices are easier to impose by fiat than are specific 
policies.”). 
 173. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 
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 175. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) 
(“Coordinated review of agency rulemaking is necessary . . . . The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) shall carry out that review function.”). 
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documents.”176 These policies are designed to increase the quality, 
transparency, consistency, fairness, and accountability of agency 
guidance practices.177 To that end, the Bulletin suggests that 
agencies engage in “procedures similar to APA notice-and-
comment requirements” for some types of guidance documents in 
order to “increase the quality of the guidance and provide for 
greater public confidence in and acceptance of the ultimate 
agency judgments.”178 Similar language appears in the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) official guidance on 
preparing Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs),179 which all 
agencies—including the FBI—must generate for any 
substantially revised or new Information Technology System that 
collects, maintains, or disseminates personally identifiable 
information from or about members of the public.180 According to 
the DHS Guidance, requiring agencies to follow procedures 
designed to call attention to issues of legitimacy “demonstrates to 
the public and to Congress” that the new systems “have 
consciously incorporated privacy protections.”181 In other words, 
both OMB and DHS policy takes the position that procedural 
constraints result in both better substantive rules and an 
increase in the perceived legitimacy of those rules, even when 
those constraints are self-imposed rather than statutorily 
required.  
A final preliminary note: implementing these reforms would 
not be costless. As an initial matter, any increase in the 
onerousness of modifying the Guidelines creates pressure to shift 
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policy-making decisions to a level where these rules do not apply, 
making accountability even more elusive. For this reason, any 
efforts at reform would have to apply to changes to the DIOG as 
well as the Guidelines, and consider ways to prevent further 
devolution of decision-making responsibility. These suggested 
changes would also, of course, consume time and personnel not 
currently devoted to the Guidelines. But these costs need not be 
prohibitive. As an initial matter, the costs themselves would 
impose a potentially valuable barrier to arbitrary or unnecessary 
changes. Only when changes are in fact necessary will the 
Attorney General or FBI Director undertake the amendment 
process. Moreover, the Guidelines and DIOG are modified so 
infrequently that the need to allocate additional resources to the 
project would be rare. If implemented effectively, these rare 
additional costs would be justified by their benefits. 
B. Reason-Giving as Constraint 
Courts and commentators have raised a litany of reasons 
why extending broad discretion to administrative agencies can be 
problematic from a governance standpoint—reasons that apply 
with equal force to the FBI’s exercise of intelligence-collection 
powers. Agency strategy for channeling discretion, largely 
dominated by reason-giving requirements, is therefore an 
important source of ideas for addressing that concern in the 
context of the Guidelines regime. 
1. The Downsides of Discretion 
Consigning significant policy choices to administrative 
agencies operating with broad discretion undermines the 
constitutional mechanism of promoting both accountability and 
sound decision making. When it comes to legislation, the 
Constitution seeks to avoid these concerns by subjecting 
legislative decisions to the deliberation and contestation that 
serves as a bulwark against faction and tyranny.182 Freed from 
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the requirements of Article 1, § 7,183 however, agency decision 
makers might engage in a wise and thoughtful decision-making 
process; but they are equally capable of making poor choices, 
opting for policies that are uninformed, arbitrary, irrational, self-
interested, or otherwise untethered to the public interest.184 
Absent some alternative check on the way in which discretion is 
exercised, there is therefore no reason to expect an agency’s 
decision-making process to result in the best outcome—however 
that is defined. 
Similarly, because granting decision-making authority to 
bureaucrats not subject to electoral forces that constrain other 
policymakers removes those decisions from the field of political 
battle, Congress both eludes responsibility for making difficult 
policymaking decisions and insulates the policies themselves 
from electoral backlash.185 Broad agency discretion thus 
undermines the very nature of participatory democracy and 
raises concerns about political accountability for critical decisions 
of national policy.186  
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administrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question the 
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And while the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting legislative 
delegations to agencies were confined to the New Deal-era,187 so 
long as Congress sets down an “intelligible principle” for the 
agency to follow,188 many of the procedural rules developed in the 
administrative state serve to cabin discretion.189 Thus, while 
agency decision makers continue to enjoy significant leeway, the 
threat to democracy and accountability posed by agency 
discretion has not gone unaddressed. 
2. Channeling Discretion into Reasoned Decision-Making 
The administrative state has grappled with legitimizing 
broad delegations throughout its history.190 Over the years, 
reasoned decision making emerged as an important means of 
                                                                                                     
constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy.”); Richard B. 
Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 440 (2003) (“While application of the traditional model might ensure that 
agencies acted within the bounds of their statutory powers, those bounds were 
so wide as to give agencies vast discretionary powers, creating a palpable 
democracy deficit and the threat of arbitrary power.”). 
 187. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 
(1935) (“We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”); Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating portions of federal legislation for 
excessive delegation of authority to the executive). 
 188. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 472 (“[W]e repeatedly have said that 
when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must 
‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))). 
 189. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 
YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (arguing that Chenery’s requirement that an agency 
provide an adequate basis for a rule “operates both to bolster the political 
accountability of the agency’s action and to prevent arbitrariness in the agency’s 
exercise of its discretion”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation 
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that many judicial rules 
regarding interpreting the scope of agency power are designed to address the 
excessive delegation concern). 
 190. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–92 (2003) 
(arguing that initial concerns about the administrative state’s role in the 
constitutional structure focused, first and foremost, on the dangers of arbitrary 
decision making and that such concerns have persisted). 
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limiting discretion and improving the quality of agency 
policymaking by requiring agencies to justify their actions.191 And 
while these reason-giving requirements exist in part to facilitate 
judicial review of agency action, they also have the intrinsic value 
of promoting agency experts’ exercise of their discretion in a 
thoughtful, principled fashion.192 These requirements come from 
two sources: the Administrative Procedure Act193 supplemented 
by the requirement from SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II)194 
that agency actions are valid only if they can be upheld according 
to the rationale given by the agency at the time the decision was 
made.195 
                                                                                                     
 191. See, e.g., id. at 528 (noting the emergence of reasoned decision making 
and the “hard look” doctrine); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in 
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1777–79 (2007) (summarizing 
the history and rationale behind reasoned decision-making requirements in 
administrative law); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1779–80 (1975) (describing judicial 
insistence that agencies engage in reasoned decision making); see also INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 952 n.16 (1983) (noting that the Constitution itself 
insists that legislation be subjected to deliberation and that the executive’s 
discretion in carrying out legislative mandates is limited by the scope of the 
legislative delegation). 
 192. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (holding that the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test requires 
reasoned decision making); see also, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 
U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (“[W]e have before us here a full-dress regulation, issued by 
the Comptroller himself and adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment 
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act designed to assure due 
deliberation . . . .”); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79 nn.226–27 (1998) (noting that 
the APA facilitates deliberative agency decisions); Stewart, supra note 191, at 
1670 (noting that APA procedures are “designed to promote the accuracy, 
rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative directives”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 
60–61 (1985) (“Much of modern administrative law is a means of serving the 
original purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, and of promoting Madisonian 
goals, without invalidating regulatory statutes or relying on traditional 
conceptions of private property.”). 
 193. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) 
(explaining the notice-and-comment requirements of rulemaking under the 
APA). 
 194. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).  
 195. See id. at 196 (“[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or 
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must 
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the 
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The APA procedures for informal rulemaking employ two 
strategies for ensuring that agencies can engage in a process of 
reasoned decision making.196 First, the APA has a notice 
requirement, which is designed to broaden the range of 
information and perspectives the agency must take into 
account197 in order to promote more informed decision making.198 
To ensure these goals are met, the APA demands that an agency’s 
notice must “fairly apprise interested persons of the subjects and 
issues” at stake whenever they intend to engage in a 
rulemaking199 and indicate the rulemaking’s legal and factual 
basis as well as its policy purpose.200 Thus, the APA aims to 
ensure that agencies have before them all relevant information 
when making policy decisions. 
The second element of the APA’s strategy for channeling 
discretion is the obligation that agencies issue a public statement 
when announcing a final rule.201 Just as written judicial opinions 
demonstrate that a court’s decision is supported by facts, law, and 
                                                                                                     
agency.”); Stack, supra note 189, at 956 (“The [Chenery] principle now applies in 
review of every form of agency action, from agency rulemaking to informal 
adjudication, as well as in review of all manner of deficiencies in agency fact-
finding and insufficient statements of reasons . . . .”).  
 196. The APA lays down procedures for two forms of agency action, 
rulemaking and adjudication, each of which may be pursued through either 
formal or informal proceedings. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556, 557. 
 197. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 
547 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[N]otice improves the quality of agency rulemaking by 
ensuring that agency regulations will be ‘tested by exposure to diverse public 
comment.’” (quoting BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641 (1st 
Cir. 1979))). 
 198. Id.; Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (“The process of notice and comment rulemaking is . . . to be a process of 
reasoned decision-making.”). 
 199. NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 200. Administrative Procedure Act, § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see also 
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 
1977) (noting that scientific data used in an agency’s rulemaking analysis 
should be disclosed during the notice process); Portland Cement Ass’n v. 
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“It is not consonant with the 
purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of . . . 
data . . . known only to the agency.”). 
 201. See id. § 553(c) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented, 
the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of 
their basis and purpose.”). 
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precedent, these statements of purpose serve to demonstrate that 
agency officials considered all of the information before them and 
engaged in a “process of reasoned decision-making.”202 To that 
end, the statement must include the rule’s basis and purpose as 
well as a justification of the decisions that led to its adoption, and 
it must “indicate the major issues of policy that were raised in the 
proceedings and explain why the agency decided to respond to 
these issues as it did.”203 Moreover, under Chenery II, only if the 
purpose provided by the agency constitutes a valid justification 
for the decision will it be legitimate.204 
Rules should similarly dictate that the Attorney General or 
FBI Director provide notice explaining the reasons for any 
proposed changes to the Guidelines or the DIOG and a 
justification for the ultimate decisions that demonstrates that all 
of the relevant available information was taken into 
consideration and that there was a valid basis for the change. The 
distinctions between traditional administrative law and national 
security administration require, however, some adjustments to 
the usual procedural design. While most agency notices of 
proposed rulemaking are part of the public record and freely 
available for wide dissemination, the classified nature of much of 
the FBI’s activity and some of the rules contained in the DIOG 
requires that the dissemination of the notice and justification will 
often be limited to individuals with the necessary security 
clearance.205 Imagine, for example, a proposed rule-change 
designed to modify surveillance operations to make them less 
likely to be detected by the target. Publicizing that intention and 
                                                                                                     
 202. Conn. Light & Power Co., 673 F.2d at 528.  
 203. Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); see also S. REP. NO. 752-79, pt. IV(4)(b) (1945) (“The required 
statement of the basis and purpose of rules issued should not only relate to the 
data so presented but with reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and 
objectives of the rule.”). 
 204. See Stack, supra note 189, at 956 (“The Chenery principle makes the 
validity of agency action depend upon the validity of contemporaneous agency 
reason-giving.”). 
 205. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012) (exempting from public disclosure 
obligations records or information that could reasonably disclose confidential 
sources, law enforcement procedures or techniques, or lead to circumvention of 
the law).  
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the resulting rule might undermine entirely the purpose of the 
revision.  
While the effect of limited dissemination of notice and 
justification will not be as robust as a process that is entirely 
transparent, limits on dissemination need not render written 
notice and justification worthless. In addressing concerns over 
excessive discretion, the crucial elements of the relevant 
administrative strategy are (1) that the notice broaden the range 
of information and perspectives that the agency considers and 
(2) that the written justification demonstrates that the agency’s 
decision enjoys sufficient factual and legal support. To accomplish 
this, the notice and justification must go to individuals or entities 
whose participation would serve to expand the information and 
perspectives available to the decision makers and whose scrutiny 
of the ultimate justification would encourage the adoption of rules 
supported by reasoned argument and available evidence.  
Candidates to receive this notice and justification are both 
inside and outside the Justice Department. The Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division and Office of Privacy and 
Civil Liberties as well as the National Security Division could be 
invited to comment. Similarly, other members of the intelligence 
community, such as the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence should be involved. But the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) should contribute its 
perspective as well. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of 
possibilities. Nor will each of these institutions necessarily take 
on the role of civil-liberties champion or do so effectively.206 For 
now, it is enough to say that so long as they have access to the 
relevant information and bring a perspective different from the 
one within the Attorney General’s office or the FBI, their 
participation would help to channel discretion in a productive 
direction.  
The 2008 modifications to the Guidelines provide a concrete 
example of how the requirement that the Attorney General 
provide reasons justifying amendments could impact the process. 
                                                                                                     
 206. Neither the Justice Department’s Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties 
nor the Civil Rights Division have been particularly successful in counteracting 
the policy preferences of the FBI. 
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One proffered justification for amending the Guidelines in 2008 
was that they were necessary to provide tools the FBI needed to 
support its preventive role.207 But the then-existing Guidelines 
already described prevention as the FBI’s “central mission,” and 
included several provisions added in 2002 that were aimed at 
empowering and enabling this aspect of the FBI’s activities.208 In 
asserting that the 2008 Guidelines were necessary for terrorism 
prevention, the Bureau had no obligation to explain how its 
activities were unacceptably constrained by the rules that were 
then in effect, which were drafted for the same purpose.209 Under 
these proposed rules, the Attorney General would have had to 
make that case, allowing those entities that were notified the 
opportunity to question the need for changes and possibly even 
make those concerns public.210 And if the Attorney General could 
not do so satisfactorily, it would have made altering the 
Guidelines a much more controversial proposition.  
Requiring written justification of the final rules also might 
have had an impact on the 2008 revisions. On the one hand, the 
Justice Department downplayed the extent to which the 
Guidelines expanded the FBI’s powers. The new Guidelines were 
characterized as merely consolidating several existing sets of 
rules without making substantive changes.211 In fact, Justice 
Department officials asserted that assessments were nothing 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Mukasey Speech, supra note 83 (explaining how the new Attorney 
General Guidelines would help to transform the FBI into an “elite national 
security organization” by shifting focus from “investigating crimes after they 
occur to collecting the intelligence necessary to detect and prevent attacks 
before they occur”).  
 208. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 11. 
 209. See supra Part II.B.   
 210. See supra Part III.B.  
 211. See Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of Robert S. 
Mueller, Director, FBI) (“[T]he new guidelines are not designed to give the FBI 
any broad new authorities.”); Mukasey Speech, supra note 83 (“The new 
consolidated guidelines will, in short, integrate more completely and harmonize 
the standards that apply to the FBI’s activities.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Briefing with Department Officials on Consolidated Attorney General 
Guidelines (Sept. 12, 2008) [hereinafter DOJ Briefing] (“[O]n the national 
security side, it was a new concept to have what were called ‘threat 
assessments . . . . That was new in 2003; this is not anything different now.”). 
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new, and that under the pre-2008 Guidelines it could already 
conduct assessments using pretext interviews, physical 
surveillance, and the tasking of informants.212 But there was no 
“assessment” level in the pre-2008 Guidelines.213 Indeed, they 
explicitly prohibited both pretext interviews and physical 
surveillance until a preliminary inquiry—a predicated 
investigation—had been opened.214 “Threat assessments” were 
permitted in some contexts under the 2003 National Security 
Investigation Guidelines, but by the FBI’s own admission, some 
of the techniques available in today’s assessments were 
prohibited in that context.215 Had the Attorney General or FBI 
Director been required to explain exactly what changes were 
being made and provide the rationale for the new rules, the 
creation of assessments in their current form—the central 
innovation of the 2008 Guidelines—might have met with more 
resistance. In particular, the ways in which assessments 
expanded the FBI’s powers, for example permitting use of several 
investigative techniques historically reserved for predicated 
investigations, would have become clear and consequently would 
have been subject to closer examination. As it was, the Attorney 
General could simply disclaim the idea that new powers were 
being granted without having to substantiate that statement.  
                                                                                                     
 212. See DOJ Briefing, supra note 211  
And the changed techniques are the physical surveillance, which 
had been available if you were investigating under general 
crimes, but not under national security; recruiting and tasking 
of sources, which again had been available if it was general 
crimes, but not national security; and then the pretext 
interviews.  
 213. Cf. id. (“[T]he decision was reached in 2003 that there needed to be 
some level of activity before a formal investigation [to] allow the FBI to be 
proactive. . . . What has changed are some of the techniques that are available 
in the assessment level.”).   
 214. See ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 36, § II.B.6 (listing those 
investigative techniques available “without any prior authorization from a 
supervisory agent”). 
 215. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR FBI 
NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
§ II.A (2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf (listing 
activities available at the threat assessment stage without opening an 
investigation, not including pretext interviews or physical surveillance). 
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In addition to any substantive differences to the 2008 
Guidelines that would have resulted, a notice and justification 
requirement would have provided other concrete benefits. First, it 
would have guaranteed that decision makers had the benefit of 
additional perspectives while they were still developing the 
policy. It is much easier—and therefore more likely—for 
policymakers to incorporate alternative perspectives into policy 
still being developed than once that policy is nearing its final 
form.216 Second, obligating the Attorney General to address the 
information that was submitted to him and to explain in writing 
why the Guidelines should be implemented in his chosen format 
would force him to digest that information and therefore might 
actually result in a more informed decision.217 Third, it would 
have added additional legitimacy to the final product if218 the 
2008 Guidelines development had been based on specific, 
reasoned arguments regarding the need for modifications. 
C. Participatory Policymaking 
Nowhere does the Constitution provide for the existence of 
administrative agencies, much less for specific means of ensuring 
that their actions do not infringe on fundamental rights or that 
they are subject to democratic accountability.219 The 
administrative state has grappled with this “democracy deficit” 
almost since its inception.220 One means employed to address it 
has been through increasing opportunities for broad participation 
in agency decision making. Designing ways to employ these 
                                                                                                     
 216. See Bressman, supra note 190, at 542 (explaining that notice-and-
comment rulemaking facilitates prospective policymaking including broader 
perspectives). 
 217. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.  
 218. See Bressman, supra note 190, at 542–43 (arguing that notice-and-
comment rulemaking leads to a decrease in arbitrariness because of the input 
from affected parties). 
 219. See id. at 462 (describing the struggle to reconcile the administrative 
state with our constitutional structure). 
 220. See id. (explaining the constant attempt to square the administrative 
state with a constitutional structure that presumes the accountability of 
policymakers). 
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strategies for increased participation could lend increased 
democratic legitimacy to the intelligence-collection realm. 
1. Administrative Agencies’ Democracy Deficit 
Administrative agencies initially were viewed either as 
entities merely implementing congressional will or as bastions of 
expertise, making decisions on the basis of scientific or technical 
knowledge.221 By the latter half of the twentieth century, 
however, it had become clear that many congressional 
delegations are vague and that many agency decisions cannot be 
resolved definitively through substantive expertise.222 Instead, 
such decisions often rest on subjective judgments about policy 
priorities, the value of human well-being, and who should bear 
the costs of inevitable risks. The Guidelines are thus not alone in 
their undemocratic nature. This democracy deficit “has spawned 
an extensive literature concerning the legitimacy of the 
administrative state.”223 Indeed, Professor Jody Freeman has 
suggested that “[a]dministrative law scholarship has organized 
itself largely around the need to defend the administrative state 
against accusations of illegitimacy”224 based on the 
unaccountability of agency officials, a lack of transparency, and 
limited opportunities for public participation.225 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. at 470–74 (explaining the early models of administrative 
agencies); Stewart, supra note 186, at 1671–75 (discussing “the Traditional 
Model” of American administrative law);  United States v. Nova Scotia Food 
Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing the role of 
scientific data in an agency’s rulemaking analysis). 
 222. See Stewart, supra note 186, at 440–41 (discussing the New Deal 
regulatory regime which led to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure 
Act).  
 223. David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government 
Decision Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 
ENVTL. L. 651, 653 (2006).  
 224. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 546 (2000). 
 225. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 192, at 27 (describing the administrative 
process as the “proverbial black box that mysteriously translates legislative 
inputs into regulatory outcomes”); id. at 97 (asserting that the administrative 
state does not “encourage widespread participation”). 
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2. Increasing Democracy, Increasing Participation 
One answer to the democracy deficit implemented by the 
administrative state has been to boost the democratic pedigree of 
agency rules by insisting on broad participation.226 A variety of 
procedural and doctrinal rules in the administrative state 
promote the broad participation of interested stakeholders. As 
with limits on discretion, the informal rulemaking process set out 
in the APA promotes participation through the implementation of 
strategies that can help improve the democratic pedigree of the 
Guidelines and the DIOG. 
The first element of the strategy for improved democratic 
legitimacy is that the notice of proposed rulemaking itself must 
be provided in such a way as to facilitate meaningful 
participation,227 such as including the legal and factual basis for 
the proposed rule228 and the data on which the agency relied in 
making its proposal.229 These mandates ensure that stakeholders 
who want to participate have enough information to permit them 
to raise objections, provide additional information, or offer 
alternative perspectives. The notice, therefore, not only alerts 
diverse interested parties that there is a decision being 
contemplated for which they might want to provide input, but 
also ensures that input can be meaningful. Second, the agency 
must actually consider this input. A final rule’s statement of 
basis and purpose must “indicate the major issues of policy that 
                                                                                                     
 226. See Stewart, supra note 186, at 444 (stating that various methods of 
“[p]ublic participation . . . have become central foundations of administrative 
law and practice”); Schuck, supra note 185, at 781 (“Today, the administrative 
agency is often the site where public participation in lawmaking is most 
accessible, most meaningful, and most effective.”). 
 227. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 
552 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (defining a situation where the EPA’s regulations were 
struck down by the court because the notice of proposed rulemaking was 
insufficient to put the public fully on notice). 
 228. See NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that an 
agency must give notice to apprise interested parties of the “subjects and issues 
before the Agency”). 
 229. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods., Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–
52 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that an agency that promulgates a rule based on 
scientific data must make that data available to the public during the comment 
period). 
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were raised in the proceedings and explain why the agency 
decided to respond to these issues as it did.”230 Thus any failure to 
take into account relevant comments can invalidate the rule. This 
risk of invalidation discourages the development of rules that do 
not take all relevant perspectives into consideration.231  
Again, these requirements will also result in rules that enjoy 
more democratic legitimacy than a rule prepared without such 
input. Affected parties are more likely to view agency decisions as 
legitimate if the process provides for a meaningful opportunity for 
presentation and consideration of their views. And if the rules are 
considered legitimate, the FBI will be much more likely to enjoy 
the full support and cooperation of the communities it is policing, 
leading to more effective intelligence collection.  
Devising rulemaking mechanisms that are inclusive and 
allow for meaningful input from interested stakeholders presents 
a challenge when it comes to the domestic-intelligence regime 
because secrecy presents a formidable barrier to inclusion.232 
Even with respect to rules that are themselves public, such as the 
Guidelines, robust public participation in the process is 
impractical because there is insufficient public information about 
how those rules are implemented. The public may know, for 
example, that FBI agents are permitted to attend any religious 
service that is open to the public.233 But it will not know how 
                                                                                                     
 230. Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); see also S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 20 (2d Sess. 1946) (“The statement of the 
‘basis and purpose’ of rules . . . should be fully explanatory of the complete 
factual and legal basis as well as the object or objects sought.”). 
 231. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and 
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 489 (1999) (discussing 
how the rulemaking process allows individuals to advance perspectives while 
others scrutinize those perspectives); see also Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 
673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“One particularly important component of 
the reasoning process [in rulemaking] is the opportunity for interested parties to 
participate in a meaningful way. . . .”). 
 232. See, e.g., Kerry E. Rodgers, The Limits of Collaborative Governance: 
Homeland Security and Environmental Protection at U.S. Ports, 25 VA. ENVT’L. 
L.J. 157, 160–65 (2007) (noting secrecy of policy, lack of publicly available 
information, and difficulty in identifying stakeholders as barriers to 
collaborative governance in the security context). 
 233. See DIOG, supra note 12, § 4.2.2 (explaining that the FBI may 
investigate activities or persons so long as it does not infringe on the free 
exercise of religion guaranteed in the First Amendment).  
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often agents engage in this activity, what information they 
collect, or what is done with the information. Rules that are 
themselves secret, such as portions of the DIOG, present an even 
more formidable challenge. To be sure, a strong case can be made 
that the existing levels of secrecy—with respect to both the rules 
and the policy implementation—are excessive.234 Unless and until 
that secrecy is reduced, however, intelligence-collection policies 
will struggle to gain the benefits that inhere in broadly inclusive 
agency rulemaking.  
Yet, the Justice Department clearly hopes to realize at least 
some of the benefits of democratic input when it comes to the 
Guidelines. Recall the Department’s 2008 briefing of relevant 
congressional committees and other interested parties prior to 
the Guidelines’ adoption.235 The Bureau did the same thing in 
2001 when it revised the DIOG.236 These meetings allowed the 
FBI to characterize these documents as rules developed with 
input from an array of stakeholders and thus deserving of the 
enhanced legitimacy that broad participation confers.237 So even 
if the consultations themselves failed to result in meaningful 
participation beyond the Justice Department,238 they indicate 
recognition that agency decision makers desire (at least the 
appearance of) an inclusive process. 
The benefits of participatory decision making require a more 
robust process than the one undertaken in 2008. Recognizing that 
                                                                                                     
 234. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What 
Works, 27 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 399, 415–16 (describing the legitimacy of “national 
security secrecy” and problems of “bureaucratic secrecy”). 
 235. See DOJ Briefing, supra note 211 (describing the way in which the FBI 
and DOJ included relevant congressional committees in discussions about 
consolidating the multiple sets of guidelines into one).  
 236. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 644–48 (explaining that the FBI consulted 
various groups before the new Attorney General’s Guidelines were issued); 
Savage, supra note 89 (noting that the FBI consulted the ACLU about the new 
Guidelines prior to their issuance). 
 237. Supra note 236 and accompanying text; see Elisebeth Collins Cook, 
Assistant Attorney Gen. & Valerie Caproni, FBI Gen. Counsel, Joint Statement 
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: New Attorney General 
Guidelines for Domestic Intelligence (Sept. 23, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag-domestic-intel-guidelines.pdf (discussing the 
revisions). 
 238. See infra notes 329–30. 
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the public at large will not be able to play a meaningful role, a 
second-best measure is to seek out proxies for points of view 
currently not formally represented in the process of developing 
the Guidelines and the DIOG. An example comes from Professors 
DeShazo and Freeman’s empirical case study of the licensing 
practices of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.239 In the 
amended Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986,240 “Congress 
[required the Commission] to consult with fish and wildlife 
agencies prior to issuing licenses [and demanded] that 
nondevelopmental values be given ‘equal consideration’ with 
power concerns.”241 DeShazo and Freeman explain that this 
amendment was specifically intended to strengthen the role of 
resource agencies in the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s decision-making process242 and that it did in fact 
have the desired effect.243 
                                                                                                     
 239. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2221 (2005) (“We argue . . . agencies can be prompted to 
take their secondary missions more seriously when Congress enhances 
interagency lobbying by increasing the power of other agencies, which derive 
relevant expertise and interests from their own statutory mandates, to lobby the 
implementing agency.” (emphasis added)); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: 
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. 
REV. 1, 5–6 (2009) (suggesting that in  DeShazo & Freeman’s model,“the impact 
of the comments will be based primarily on their persuasiveness or political 
import, and on the pressure they may place on the decision-making agency to 
develop better measures of performance on secondary goals”). 
 240. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 
Stat. 1243 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 7977b, 823b (2012)). 
 241. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2253. 
 242. The Electric Consumers Protection Act (ECPA) required the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), rather than the license applicant, to 
consult with state and federal resource agencies before submitting their 
applications to FERC, required that FERC establish a dispute resolution 
process to mediate its disagreements with other agencies, demanded that FERC 
provide an explanation whenever it chose not to implement the 
recommendations of other agencies, and forced FERC to engage in monitoring to 
ensure that dam operators complied with any imposed environmental 
conditions. See id. at 2225–26 (explaining the added obligations placed on the 
FERC by the ECPA). 
 243. See id. at 2226–27, 2275–80, 2289 (discussing the purpose and effect of 
the amendment); Biber, supra note 239, at 43  
DeShazo and Freeman show through statistical analysis that, after 
the passage of the statutory changes, FERC consistently imposed 
more environmental conditions on the approval or renewal of dam 
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A procedural regime governing the Guidelines’ development 
could similarly mandate the participation of particular entities 
that will bring alternative perspectives to the discussion. Each of 
the entities noted as a potential recipient of notice and source of 
information could play this role. One especially promising 
candidate for this role is the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB), a statutorily created independent 
agency charged with ensuring that privacy and civil liberties 
concerns are considered in the development and implementation 
of laws, regulations, and policies related to terrorism.244 The 
PCLOB took several years to get off the ground.245 In the wake of 
recent revelations regarding NSA surveillance, however, it has 
demonstrated its ability to participate in the surveillance-policy 
conversation by insisting on a classified briefing about the 
controversial surveillance programs, meeting with the 
President,246 holding a public hearing seeking concrete 
suggestions for improving the civil liberties protections included 
as part of those programs.247 Based in part on what members of 
the Board learned at that meeting, the PCLOB issued a detailed 
report recommending specific changes to one existing surveillance 
program and anticipates issuing similar reports about other 
programs.248 Whether any of the PCLOB’s recommendations will 
                                                                                                     
licenses, and that this is correlated with increased participation in 
FERC licensing programs by fish and wildlife agencies. 
 244. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012) (establishing the PCLOB and mandating 
that it “review proposed legislation, regulations, and policies related to efforts to 
protect the Nation from terrorism”). 
 245. See Phillip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 283, 383 & nn.352–53 (2011) (explaining that the PCLOB 
was established under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 but became independent in 2007 by the Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission Act).  
 246. See Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Bd., Statement (June 20, 2013) 
(thanking the President for meeting with the board and for providing briefings) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. See generally PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., WORKSHOP 
REGARDING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 215 OF 
THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2013), http://www.pclob.gov/All%20Documents/July%209, 
%202013%20Workshop%20Transcript.pdf (seeking suggestions about how to 
protect civil liberties in light of NSA surveillance programs). 
 248. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE 
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be adopted remains to be seen. But giving the Board an official 
role in the process in which the Guidelines and the DIOG are 
formulated would ensure that the civil liberties point of view is 
represented.  
This participation could take one of several forms, ranging 
from an opportunity to express views to veto power.249 If the 
requirement is modeled on the concept behind the participation 
requirements included in notice-and-comment rulemaking, then 
it will end up somewhere between these two extremes, with 
something like the following arrangement: The PCLOB would 
have the opportunity to submit its perspective; having received 
this input, the Attorney General or the FBI Director would be 
required to demonstrate that it was taken into consideration.   
Finding ways to broaden the perspectives involved when it 
comes to the DIOG is particularly important. Currently, nobody 
outside the FBI must be involved. Ensuring that alternative 
perspectives are voiced and requiring that the final rules reflect, 
or explain why they fail to reflect, these perspectives may provide 
some of the benefits of the multilateral, deliberative process that 
truly pluralist rulemaking procedures promote.250  
                                                                                                     
TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2013), http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/ 
PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf (analyzing the NSA’s 
telephony metadata collection program and making twelve recommendations for 
reform); Alston, supra note 245, at 383 (explaining that the PCLOB’s task is “to 
scrutinize privacy and civil liberties issues raised by national security policies 
and programs”).  
 249. See generally Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without 
Authority in Federal Agencies (U. Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 353, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2322797 
(describing various mechanisms used in the administrative state to infuse 
agency action with a particular desired value or viewpoint).  
 250. Any entities involved in decision making regarding the Guidelines’ or 
DIOG’s contents also should be entitled to suggest a change to the rules in the 
same way that the public has the right to petition an agency to issue, modify, or 
rescind a rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (providing this right). 
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D. Reconciling Conflicting Missions 
Administrative governance also has developed ways to 
address the challenges posed when agencies are responsible for 
pursuing multiple, competing goals. The FBI must carry out its 
mission of preventing security threats from manifesting while 
simultaneously protecting fundamental rights. The principles 
behind the administrative state’s tactics for reconciling 
conflicting missions offer ideas about how to implement 
structural checks to prevent the FBI’s intelligence-collection 
mission from overwhelming these other important interests. 
1. Juggling Mandates 
Conflict among agency missions comes about when one or 
more statutes issue mandates to a single agency that come into 
tension with one another or when government-wide mandates 
conflict with the primary goals of individual agencies subject to 
those mandates.251 In one example, the National Park Service 
must protect the natural resources of the parks while 
simultaneously developing facilities for visitors.252 Similarly, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service is required to manage wildlife refuges 
for the conservation of plants and animals while also providing 
for recreation on those refuges.253 And the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)254 requires “all federal 
agencies” to minimize the environmental impacts of their 
actions.255 For an agency focused on, for example, building roads 
                                                                                                     
 251. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2220 (“Congress can create the 
potential for interstatutory conflicts where the agency must balance multiple 
and potentially competing obligations arising from different statutes usually 
passed at different times by different enacting majorities.”). 
 252. See Biber, supra note 239, at 7–8 (pointing out that 16 U.S.C. § 1 and 
§ 668dd(a)(2)-(3)(B) mandate that the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service both conserve and allow for “compatible wildlife-dependent recreation”). 
 253. Id. at 7.  
 254. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, §§ 2–209, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321–4347 (2012).  
 255. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B), which requires all federal agencies 
to consider “unquantified environmental amenities and values” along with 
“economic and technical considerations,” and § 4332(C), which requires federal 
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through environmentally sensitive territory, the charge to protect 
the environment can be at odds with this focus.  
The FBI’s mandate to protect civil liberties can be viewed as 
a “secondary” mission—one that frequently comes into tension 
with its primary mission of preventing security threats.256 
Studies show that an agency will focus on what it considers to be 
its primary mission, and it will shirk on performing “secondary” 
or less easily evaluated goals.257 As a secondary mission, 
protection of civil liberties is, therefore, sure to be short-changed 
in favor of security in the same way that environmental concerns 
have so often gone under-addressed in favor of development or 
other economically profitable activities. 
2. Relieving the Tension Among Multiple Missions 
Fortunately, several administrative law strategies suggest 
ways to ensure that the Guidelines regime sufficiently takes into 
account civil liberties concerns as well as security concerns.258 
Though all of the options discussed below are possible paths to 
follow, the final two approaches discussed below seem 
particularly promising. 
Congress Reclaims Authority. One option, of course, is for 
Congress simply to relieve an agency of responsibility for one of 
                                                                                                     
agencies to develop environmental impact statements for all major federal 
actions). 
 256. See id. at 3 (explaining the problem of multiple-goal agencies and the 
inevitability that these goals will conflict with each other). 
 257. See id. at 9 (citing studies and “predict[ing] that agencies faced with 
conflicting tasks will systematically overperform on the tasks that are easier to 
measure and have higher incentives, and underperform on the tasks that are 
harder to measure and have lower incentives.”). 
 258. See generally Biber, supra note 239 (discussing various strategies 
agencies use to meet both primary goals and secondary goals). Other 
commentators have addressed the issue from a more specific angle. See, e.g., 
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2253 (discussing efforts to ensure that 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission took environmental concerns into 
account when making licensing decisions); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional 
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (discussing the challenges that arise because 
prosecutors have the dual role of making both charging and adjudicatory 
decisions). 
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the competing goals, reclaiming that decision-making authority 
for itself.259 Following revelations of civil liberties violations in 
the 1970s, Congress reclaimed some decision-making authority 
regarding the executive’s surveillance powers by enacting the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).260 Or Congress 
could generate more piecemeal limitations, barring particular 
techniques that pose threats to civil liberties, or defining the 
circumstances under which such techniques could be used. 
Congress could, for example, statutorily reinstate the rule 
regarding the use of undercover agents to investigate First 
Amendment protected activities as it existed in the Guidelines in 
2001, which required that the FBI have probable cause or a 
reason to believe a crime had been committed before sending an 
agent into the meetings of a religious or political group.261 
Congress need not legislate to bring such changes about. If 
Congress wanted to alter particular investigative tactics, or even 
to pressure the Justice Department to adopt of its own volition 
the type of procedural framework suggested in this Article, it has 
an array of tools at its disposal to press for its desired policy 
change. Just the threat of legislation, so long as it is credible, can 
spur executive action. Recall that the original Attorney General’s 
Guidelines were implemented to sap the momentum from 
Congress’s efforts to enact a legislative charter for the FBI.262 So 
long as the option of enacting an FBI charter remains a viable 
means for Congress to limit the Attorney General’s discretion 
when it comes to FBI investigations, the threat of such legislation 
can be used to press for Congress’s desired policy outcomes. 
Congress possesses carrots as well as sticks—its control over the 
FBI and Justice Department’s budget also can impose a great 
                                                                                                     
 259. See Biber, supra note 239, at 32–33 (describing the Wilderness Act, 
which eliminated several land-management agencies’ power to create or 
eliminate wilderness areas). 
 260. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 261. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 5 (2002) 
(discussing when the FBI may use undercover agents to investigate a religious 
organization). 
 262. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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deal of pressure for policy change. Given the political economy of 
this policy area,263 however, reliance on Congress to reconcile the 
tension between the FBI’s security mission and civil liberties is 
not the most promising route. 
Separate Agency Functions. Another way that the 
administrative state deals with competing mandates is to 
separate agency functions, assigning one mandate to another 
(new or pre-existing) agency and leaving each free to focus solely 
on its own particular mandate. The APA’s requirement that 
investigative and adjudicative functions be separated from one 
another, thereby insulating some decision making from possibly 
biased influences,264 is a way to implement this division-of-
functions idea within a single agency. Professor Rachel Barkow 
has advocated, for example, for the separation of adjudicative and 
enforcement functions within prosecutors’ offices.265 And in the 
domestic investigative context, the United Kingdom offers an 
illustration. Rather than relying on one agency both to enforce 
criminal laws and to collect intelligence, those functions are 
divided between two different agencies.266 The police forces 
investigate crimes and enforce criminal law, and MI5 collects 
intelligence.267 Some commentators have argued that the United 
States should consider more closely the idea of spinning off the 
FBI’s intelligence-collection function into an independent 
agency.268 This alone would not, of course, address many of the 
concerns that the FBI’s current powers raise. But it is possible 
that, recognizing the special threats to civil liberties that 
                                                                                                     
 263. See supra notes 125–35 and accompanying text. 
 264. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012). 
 265. See Barkow, supra note 258, at 874 (“The problems posed by federal 
prosecutors’ combination of adjudicative and enforcement functions are the very 
same issues raised by the administrative state—and the solutions fit equally 
well in both settings.”).  
 266. See Jodie A. Kirshner, U.S. and U.K. Approaches to the War on Terror: 
The Surveillance of Religious Worship, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 
232–33 (2006) (explaining MI5’s authority to function solely as an intelligence 
agency). 
 267. Id. 
 268. See RICHARD POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE 
REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 172–97 (2005) (discussing the potential benefits 
and risks of a domestic intelligence agency). 
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intelligence collection poses, an agency designed solely for that 
purpose would be subjected to more stringent limits. Indeed, to 
prevent overreaching, MI5’s expansive intelligence-collection 
powers do not include arrest or detention authority.269 Thus 
powers that are necessary for successful anti-crime efforts could 
nonetheless be off-limits or curtailed for the intelligence agency. 
This division-of-functions solution, whether within or 
between agencies, is also unlikely to garner much support in the 
Guidelines context. As an initial matter, congressional passivity 
with respect to intelligence oversight will undermine any 
legislative efforts in this direction. But more importantly, many 
of the reforms to the intelligence community’s structure in the 
past decade-plus have been explicitly designed to consolidate, 
rather than separate, functions. Perceived information-sharing 
failures prior to 9/11 led to a chorus of calls for breaking down 
barriers both within and between agencies,270 and both Congress 
and the executive branch have responded. The USA PATRIOT 
Act’s removal of the so-called “wall,” which barred coordination 
between law enforcement and intelligence officials, is perhaps the 
most well-known, though by no means the only, post-9/11 change 
along these lines.271 Regardless of the salutary impact that 
separation of functions might have on civil liberties, the perceived 
security value of consolidation means that neither Congress nor 
the executive seems likely to reverse this trend. 
Generating Information. More promising models of 
reconciling conflicting priorities are focused on agency culture, 
rather than agency structure. One mechanism for placing 
pressure on agency culture and prompting decision makers to 
consider factors that they otherwise might not give much weight 
is a requirement that an agency generate certain types of 
                                                                                                     
 269. See Kirshner, supra note 266, at 232–33 (“To underscore its separation 
from law enforcement, MI5 cannot make arrests or detentions.”). 
 270. See THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 159, at 416–19 (advocating for 
a unified effort in information sharing across intelligence agencies); THE COMM’N 
ON INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 429–50 (2005), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf (proposing ways to 
effectuate information sharing among intelligence agencies).  
 271. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 218, 120 
Stat. 192 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  
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information. According to Professor Eric Biber, for example, “[a] 
major goal of NEPA was to force agencies that formerly had 
focused too heavily on primary missions such as highway 
construction, water-project development, or the extraction of 
natural resources, to also consider the impacts of their actions on 
the environment.”272 To accomplish this goal, NEPA requires all 
federal agencies proposing actions that will “significantly [affect] 
the quality of the human environment” to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement and make copies available to 
the public for written comments.273 These statements augment 
the information available to agencies, including the possible 
impacts on the environment, and proposals about how to avoid 
adverse environmental effects.274 And commentators agree that 
NEPA has been successful in integrating environmental goals 
into agency decision making.275 Similarly, all agencies—including 
the FBI—must generate a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for 
“any substantially revised or new Information Technology 
System”276 that collects, maintains, or disseminates personally 
identifiable information from or about members of the public.277 
And the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties generates Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Impact Assessments when required to do so by statute, when 
                                                                                                     
 272. Biber, supra note 239, at 35 (citing, inter alia, William L. Andreen, In 
Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the 
Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L.J. 205, 205 (1989)). 
 273. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (2012). 
 274. See Joseph F.C. DiMento & Helen Ingram, Science and Environmental 
Decision Making: The Potential Role of Environmental Impact Assessment in the 
Pursuit of Appropriate Information, 45 NAT. RES. J. 283, 297–98 (2005) 
(proclaiming the importance of NEPA’s environmental impact analysis 
requirements to environmental law). 
 275. See Brian L. Cole et al., Prospects for Health Impact Assessment in the 
United States: New and Improved Environmental Impact Assessment or 
Something Different?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1153, 1168 (2004) (“NEPA 
was groundbreaking in that it forced agencies, regardless of their primary 
mission, to consider the environmental repercussions of their actions . . . .”). 
 276. See The E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-307, § 208, 116 
Stat. 2899, 2921 (requiring agencies to prepare privacy impact statements in 
certain circumstances) (codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). 
 277. Id. 
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they are requested by Department officials, or when the Officer 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties believes it appropriate.278 
Generating these assessments not only facilitates oversight 
efforts from the public, the legislature, or internal watchdogs, 
but—like requiring written justifications for changes—it has 
other benefits as well. As an initial matter, it forces agency 
decision makers to consciously consider the impact their proposed 
policy will have.279 As one set of commentators put it, “a 
systematic review of potential impacts during the planning 
process can focus the attention of decision makers on issues that 
they would otherwise deem to be outside their agency’s 
mandate.”280 Requiring that effort will, at times, lead to agency 
choices more solicitous of the issue on which the assessment is 
focused. Decision-makers might simply need to be made aware of 
the impact of their choices. In addition, they will recognize that 
the substance of the assessment will be subject to scrutiny and, 
perhaps, criticism that they would rather avoid. And by ensuring 
that this information is before the decision makers while they are 
engaged in the decision-making process—rather than after the 
fact—makes the exercise all the more likely to have an impact.281 
In addition, DHS’s Privacy Office Official Guidance on Privacy 
Impact Assessments notes that the use of PIAs “demonstrates to 
the public and to Congress” that the new systems “have 
consciously incorporated privacy protections,” contributing to the 
legitimacy of the systems.282 
In order to ensure that the Attorney General or FBI Director 
consider explicitly specific “secondary” goals, he or she should be 
required to prepare a “Civil Liberties Impact Statement,” 
                                                                                                     
 278. Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-civil-liberties-impact-
assessments (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 279. See DiMento & Ingram, supra note 274, at 297–98 (arguing that EIAs 
require “conscious deliberation about the environmental effects of a proposal”). 
 280. Cole et al., supra note 275, at 1176. 
 281. See id. (arguing that the EIA process works because it incorporates 
relevant knowledge at the point of decision making). 
 282. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: THE PRIVACY 
OFFICE OFFICIAL GUIDANCE 1 (2010).  
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articulating the likely effects of any proposed changes to the 
Guidelines. Requiring the Attorney General to consider, and to 
explain, whether the cost to civil liberties of any particular rule or 
tactic outweighs its investigative benefits is sure to raise the 
profile of civil liberties protection in the decision-making process. 
And while these Statements will not include the detailed 
scientific analysis that forms part of Environmental Impact 
Statements, they will identify the potential civil liberties impacts 
of proposed rules and force government officials both to note 
those impacts, and to think about what steps can be taken to 
mitigate them.  
Inter-Agency Lobbying. A final mechanism the 
administrative state has used successfully to force agencies to 
consider specific, under-emphasized perspectives is for the 
political branches to enlist other agencies to police the primary 
decision-making agency. This idea, too, has potential in the 
Guidelines context. In some ways, this approach is simply a form 
of expanding the scope of participation, including a “lobbying” 
agency in the decision-making process to represent a particular 
interest that the decision-making agency is required to 
consider.283 In other words, for the lobbying agency, its primary 
mission is to promote an interest that may be a “secondary” goal 
to the decision-making agency. This approach can differ from 
merely expanding participation in the process in that it envisions 
a more active role for the lobbying agency than merely providing 
a particular view to the decision maker. Again, a recommendation 
already mentioned provides an example. Recall Professors 
DeShazo and Freeman’s study about the licensing practices of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the impact of 
Congress’s requirement that the Commission consult with fish 
and wildlife agencies prior to issuing licenses.284 They concluded 
that this requirement had a real impact on the Commission’s 
treatment of the fish and wildlife agencies’ concerns.285  
                                                                                                     
 283. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2222–29 (describing the 
impact of “interagency lobbying” on FERC’s decision-making process); Biber, 
supra note 239, at 44 (evaluating the “agency as lobbyist” model). 
 284. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 239–43 and accompanying text (discussing the study 
and its results). 
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Conferring a role in the decision-making process on an 
agency whose priority is the protection of fundamental rights 
might mitigate concerns that the FBI’s primary mission will 
unnecessarily endanger civil liberties. The Attorney General 
might, for example, be required to include officials from such an 
agency in the process of devising the FBI’s investigative rules—to 
give them a seat at the table. Just as including the Fish and 
Wildlife Service in agency decision making ensures that decisions 
take animal habitats into account, including an agency like the 
PCLOB could play a similar role with civil liberties concerns in 
the intelligence-collection context.286 Members and staff of the 
board—many of whom, unlike staff at the Office of the Director 
for National Intelligence (ODNI) or FBI charged with protecting 
civil liberties offices, are drawn from the privacy and civil 
liberties advocacy community287—could raise civil liberties 
concerns that particular rules present, offer alternative means of 
achieving the FBI’s desired ends, suggest procedural protections 
that should accompany particular rules, or argue that certain 
rules should not be approved at all. Most importantly, ensuring 
an entity such as the PCLOB a seat at the table means that there 
is a voice actively involved in the process whose primary concern 
is not necessarily the prevention of terrorist acts.  
While this type of interagency influence exertion can happen 
informally,288 the regulatory or legislative creation of more 
hierarchical forms of agency interaction to vindicate “secondary” 
goals is likely more effective. Such a hierarchical structure causes 
decision makers to regulate in the “shadow” of that lobbying 
agency, prompting the decision-making agency “to internalize the 
                                                                                                     
 286. See GARRETT HATCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34385, PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD: NEW INDEPENDENT AGENCY STATUS 3 (2012) 
(suggesting a role for the PCLOB in providing greater oversight for the 
intelligence community). 
 287. See Schlanger, supra note 249, at 47–48 (arguing that for offices 
dedicated to a particular value to be effective, they must be staffed by 
individuals who identify themselves professionally as dedicated to that value, 
rather than to the mission of the agency in which the office is embedded). 
 288. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2261 (noting that agencies 
might seek to influence each other to achieve a desired outcome through 
“lobbying,” much like a private lobbyist). 
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secondary mandates.”289 Consider the role of the OIRA, through 
which the Executive Office of the President monitors 
regulation.290 A presidential order places OIRA in a hierarchical 
position over federal agencies to evaluate whether the benefits of 
agencies’ proposed rules exceed their costs.291 And OIRA has the 
power not just to make suggestions for modifications but actually 
to block implementation of an agency regulation on this basis.292 
This “veto” power requires those agencies to take into account 
what they might consider a secondary goal—efficiency—when 
contemplating regulatory action.293  
As with the requirement that the Attorney General or FBI 
Director consider input from particular entities, the impact and 
effectiveness of this model would be highly contingent on the 
degree to which Justice Department officials were obligated to 
take the PCLOB’s opinions into account.294 An agency statutorily 
empowered to overrule DOJ proposals would have enormous 
practical effect. But such drastic (and implausible) measures are 
not required. Again, there are a range of possible roles for the 
PCLOB. For example, it could simply be given a seat at the table 
during the formulation of the Guidelines, allowing its 
representative to raise civil liberties concerns.295 Or a stronger 
                                                                                                     
 289. Id. at 2228. 
 290. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) 
(describing the role of the OIRA). 
 291. See id. (requiring transmission of a regulatory plan to OIRA for review). 
But see Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1756–64 (2013) (arguing that agencies can effectively 
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 292. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 239, at 2261 (explaining that third 
parties may “alert Congress so that it can intervene to correct agency 
misbehavior”).  
 293. See Biber, supra note 239, at 46–50 (explaining how OIRA developed 
and its role in reviewing the costs of federal agency rules prior to distribution); 
id. at 48 (“OMB monitors performance of agencies on a secondary goal—
maximizing economic efficiency in the achievement of other goals . . . —and 
requires achievement of at least minimal performance on that goal before it 
would approve the issuance of a rule.”). 
 294. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the role of reasoned decision making 
through notice and comment requirements). 
 295. See Schlanger, supra note 249, at 32–33 (discussing how including 
representatives of a particular point of view in working groups can influence 
policy). 
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thumb on the scale of civil liberties might be to require a report to 
Congress about any instances in which the PCLOB and the 
Attorney General or FBI Director are unable to reach agreement 
on a particular issue.296  
In sum, the procedural framework for the Guidelines should 
explicitly require that the Attorney General or FBI Director take 
into account the civil liberties costs when weighing policy options 
by preparing a “Civil Liberties Impact Statement” detailing the 
likely impact of the proposed changes on fundamental rights, and 
should empower the PCLOB to play an active role in formulating 
the Guidelines. These suggested procedures will not eliminate all 
concerns about civil liberties raised by the Guidelines and the 
DIOG. But in a context where preferred methods of rights 
protection break down, they offer a second-best option.297  
IV. Theoretical and Practical Objections 
Even if one concedes the potential value of the above reform 
suggestions, a couple of questions might arise. First, if the 
answer to the governance gap in intelligence collection is to 
import administrative law principles, why are existing proposals 
in that vein insufficient? And second, in the absence of judicial 
review and public scrutiny facilitated by transparency, how will 
the procedural requirements suggested here be enforced? This 
Part will address each of these questions in turn, arguing that 
the reforms suggested above provide a better means of addressing 
civil liberties concerns than existing reform proposals, and that 
there are available mechanisms that can enforce compliance with 
the recommended governance regime. 
                                                                                                     
 296. See id. at 33–35 (detailing how giving an agency clearance authority 
and the power to conduct reviews are tools that can encourage cooperation with 
another agency). 
 297. Cf. Katyal, supra note 172, at 2316 (arguing that when the “first-best 
concept” of an executive checked by the legislature is unavailable, “checks and 
balances must be updated to contemplate second-best executive v. executive 
divisions”). 
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A. Distinguishing Alternative Proposals 
Recognizing the inadequacy of the current regime, some 
scholars have suggested that terrorism be treated as an 
administrative problem.298 This is a profound insight. After all, 
the Justice Department and the FBI are agencies, and there is an 
entire body of law whose raison d’être is to improve agency 
governance regimes and ensure reasoned exercise of broad 
delegations of power. But existing reform proposals do not 
confront the Guidelines’ governance challenges that implicate 
civil liberties concerns. Some call for the development of 
mechanisms to improve our ability to assess the actual risk posed 
by terrorism.299 Others argue that responses to terrorism should 
take into account the unusually high psychological costs of 
terrorism.300 Yet another approach looks for governance solutions 
through the structure of congressional oversight of intelligence 
operations.301 
While some of these suggestions may prove beneficial to 
counterterrorism efforts more generally, none offers solutions to 
the civil liberties threats posed by the Guidelines and the DIOG. 
Indeed, they are not focused on meeting those challenges. Rather, 
they are concerned with broad-gauge adjustments to the 
government’s general approach to counterterrorism. As a result, 
they do not purport to offer means of channeling agency 
discretion, enhancing the Guidelines’ democratic bona fides, or 
                                                                                                     
 298. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing scholars who advocate 
taking a regulatory approach to the threat of terrorism). 
 299. See Stern & Wiener, supra note 6, at 396–97 (arguing that decision 
makers developing counterterrorism measures “need mechanisms to ensure that 
sensible risk analysis precedes precautionary actions”). 
 300. See Posner, supra note 6, at 690–97 (describing how public fear can 
hinder government measures and recommending that agencies pay special 
attention to the “psychology of fear”); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 131–33 
(describing some of the problems a government may face in attempting to 
address the panic that often results from terrorist attacks). 
 301. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: 
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1655, 1733–34 (2006) (describing a plan to reform congressional oversight of 
intelligence operations). 
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ensuring that concerns about fundamental rights are given the 
attention they deserve.  
One scholar does consider in detail what a regulatory 
approach to intelligence collection might look like on the ground. 
Professor Sam Rascoff advocates importing into the intelligence-
collection context several of the traditional means of constraining 
agency action, such as centralized cost−benefit review of agency 
rules to ensure that rules are “rational”—which he defines as 
efficient, effective, and sufficiently rights-respecting302—judicial 
review,303 and increased public participation and transparency in 
intelligence agency decision making.304 These mechanisms, he 
asserts, will create a “risk-management approach to 
counterterrorism” akin to other areas of regulatory endeavor.305 
Rascoff predicts that this approach will increase the accuracy, 
efficiency, and usefulness of the intelligence that is collected, and 
it may in fact do so.306  
In addition to yielding gains in the quality and efficiency of 
intelligence collection, Rascoff expects his approach also to 
promote the protection of rights and check abuse or illegality;307 it 
is here where his proposal, in my view, falls short. In fact, when 
it comes to addressing the civil liberties concerns inherent in the 
Guidelines regime, his approach contains two flaws. First, it is 
undertheorized. The traditional tools of administrative law—such 
as cost−benefit analysis, judicial review, and public 
                                                                                                     
 302. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 617–26 (arguing that centralized review 
would both increase accuracy and cost-effectiveness of intelligence and protect 
basic rights); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 131 (advocating cost−benefit analysis of 
counterterrorism regulations). 
 303. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 628–29 (discussing the benefits of judicial 
review of agency action). 
 304. See id. at 629–33 (explaining that pluralism, and the related concept of 
transparency, are beneficial because they provide credibility and additional 
means through which oversight may occur). 
 305. Id. at 647. 
 306. See id. at 616 (“[R]egulatory governance implies a robust framework 
that simultaneously aims to produce more accurate, [more] cost-effective, and 
more rights-protecting intelligence.”). 
 307. See id. at 622–24 (arguing that empowering accountability mechanisms 
provides the public with a better avenue for protecting rights and restraining 
abuse). 
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participation—simply cannot function effectively in the 
intelligence-collection context. Their reliance on transparency, 
public scrutiny of agency action, and judicial review renders them 
largely inapplicable to intelligence collection.308 To be sure, 
Rascoff recognizes the distinctiveness of the context and points to 
ways to modify these tools to operate more effectively in the 
intelligence-collection context. Judicial review, for example, 
would be performed by the secret Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), rather than traditional federal 
courts;309 and cost−benefit analysis would be done by experts in 
the ODNI rather than OIRA.310 But these adjustments do not go 
far enough. Instead, the obstacles to regulating intelligence 
collection require the formulation of new institutional designs 
custom-tailored to meet the challenges that intelligence-collection 
regulation presents. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
embedded in Rascoff’s proposal is an overly optimistic perspective 
on the premise—a premise belied by history—that the 
intelligence community can be relied upon to develop and enforce 
civil liberties protections on itself.  
Consider first the idea of centralized review of intelligence 
policy in the ODNI to promote intelligence-collection rules that 
are “rational”—efficient, effective, and sufficiently rights 
respecting.311 Just as OIRA subjects agency regulations to 
cost−benefit analysis, ODNI would review intelligence policies for 
rationality.312 And because this rationality includes a mandate to 
                                                                                                     
 308. See Edward Levi, Attorney Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Address to the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York 1–2 (Apr. 28, 1975), 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/levi/1975/04-28-1975.pdf (discussing the 
need for confidentiality in national security matters: “The need for 
confidentiality is old, common to all governments, essential to ours since its 
foundation”).  
 309. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 586 (“[T]he FISC ought to provide the sort 
of judicial review of agency action that I advocate . . . .”). 
 310. See id. (“The rationality review that I endorse should be performed by 
an organization within the [ODNI], modeled on [OIRA] within [OMB].”). 
 311. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (defining and discussing 
what is meant by the term “rational”). 
 312. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 586 (explaining Rascoff’s recommended use 
of the ODNI); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) 
(stating that an assessment of potential costs and benefits of regulatory action 
shall be provided to OIRA). 
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seek the appropriate balance between security and liberty, the 
argument goes, it will ensure that privacy and liberty interests 
are not ignored.313 
Looking to ODNI review as a means of rationalizing 
intelligence policy, however, is not a solution to civil liberties 
concerns. Unlike regulatory action whose economic impact can be 
measured, the liberty costs of various security policy options are 
often either speculative or a matter of subjective valuation. How 
would ODNI weigh the privacy harms caused by surveillance? 
How many unnecessary additions to a terrorist watchlist are 
justified by the detection of an incipient plot? Moreover, even if 
such considerations could be quantified, ODNI will be unable to 
know whether different, less intrusive, policies could produce the 
same positive security result. Merely instructing ODNI to take 
liberties costs into account may result in more liberty-solicitous 
policy. But because these costs cannot be objectively evaluated 
and intelligence community members are likely to assign lower 
value to them than the population at large, cost−benefit review is 
not a reliable mechanism for protecting individual rights.314  
Moreover, ODNI itself is a member of the intelligence 
community. It may be the case that ODNI “enjoys sufficient 
distance from the various intelligence agencies” that it cannot be 
co-opted by any one element of the intelligence community.315 But 
ODNI need not be “captured” by the FBI to fall prey to the same 
pro-security biases. ODNI’s website identifies its vision as, “A 
Nation made more secure because of a fully integrated 
Intelligence Community.”316 Indeed, the staff of ODNI itself, at 
least initially, was drawn from other agencies within the 
                                                                                                     
 313. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 625, 634–39 (arguing that rationality 
review will ensure more effective intelligence collection and provide a secondary 
benefit to liberty concerns). 
 314. See Daniel J. Mitchell, Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom: The 
Role of Cost−Benefit Analysis, 25 PACE L. REV. 219, 220 (2005) (discussing the 
difficulty of quantifying individual liberty and the benefits of cost−benefit 
analysis in a free society).  
 315. Rascoff, supra note 6, at 637. 
 316. Mission, Vision & Goals, OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/mission (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) 
(emphasis added) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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intelligence community.317 This vantage point inside the national 
security apparatus means that ODNI’s assessment of the value of 
proposed intelligence-collection policy and the costs of resulting 
privacy and liberty sacrifices will not differ markedly from that of 
the FBI itself. Because ODNI officials share the FBI’s primary 
mission of ensuring security, it is unclear why they would value 
civil liberties any differently than FBI officials or the Attorney 
General.318 And because quantifying the value of civil liberties is 
an inherently subjective exercise, moving responsibility for doing 
so from one element of the intelligence community to another 
seems unlikely to generate significant rights-protection 
improvements.  
Even if the ODNI is able to set aside its security hat for the 
purpose of evaluating the civil liberties implications of particular 
policies, it will receive a distorted view of the policies in question. 
ODNI will not have the benefit of information provided by 
stakeholders outside the intelligence community. Intelligence 
community officials are likely—either consciously or 
unconsciously—to overvalue their own role and to present 
information in ways that support the intelligence-collection 
policies they favor. Without subjecting such information to 
scrutiny outside the intelligence community or considering 
outside views, any relevant flaws or biases in the information 
presented to the ODNI will remain uncontested. So while 
centralized review would impose an additional layer of 
bureaucratic scrutiny of the Guidelines, the additional review 
would not replicate the benefits that centralized review has 
produced in other parts of the administrative state, at least when 
it comes to civil liberties, because the ODNI cannot offer a 
neutral, dispassionate evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks 
of intelligence-collection policy. 
                                                                                                     
 317. See GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX 19 (2011) (describing the 
ODNI as “staffed with some of the top minds from the FBI, the CIA, Homeland 
Security, and the Pentagon”); Rascoff, supra note 6, at 637 (noting that the 
ODNI “possesses the core competences” to discharge its role effectively). 
 318. See Quick Facts, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/ 
about-us/quick-facts (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (“[T]he mission of the FBI is to 
protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence 
threats . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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The suggestion that the FISC approximate the role of 
traditional judicial review of agency decision making to impose 
constraints on discretion will also fail to result in the 
preservation of civil liberties. As an initial matter, it is unclear 
what the extent of the FISC’s review might be. Traditional 
judicial review of administrative rules asks whether an agency’s 
action is consistent with the Constitution and its statutory 
mandate or whether it is arbitrary or capricious.319 But when it 
comes to most intelligence-collection rules, there is no 
constitutional or statutory standard against which a court could 
measure agency compliance.320 One proposed solution to this 
baseline problem is to have the FISC review policy for whether it 
is consistent with the intelligence agencies’ own stated 
objectives.321 Again, this proposal fails to account for the fact that 
when the intelligence community is left to determine the rules of 
its own conduct, concerns other than security will get short shrift. 
By asking intelligence agencies to identify their own objectives 
and then subjecting their efforts to meet those objectives to 
judicial review would replicate the current situation—where the 
constraints on agencies are limited to those that they agree to 
place on themselves—but with the added legitimating feature of 
judicial imprimatur.  
Another barrier to enlisting the FISC in intelligence-
collection governance is that the intelligence-collection activities 
governed by the Guidelines extend beyond the scope of the FISC’s 
jurisdiction. The FISC oversees electronic foreign intelligence 
surveillance and physical searches of premises connected with 
foreign powers.322 It has no role in overseeing purely domestic 
                                                                                                     
 319. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(e) (2012) (detailing the scope of review for a 
reviewing court). 
 320. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 591 (discussing the types of legal rules 
that apply to intelligence collection and noting the lack of governance for the 
conduct of human intelligence collection).  
 321. See id at 628 (proposing that at some regular interval a court should 
“review the agency’s program for fidelity to the agency’s own stated (and 
previously approved) objectives”); cf. Bressman, supra note 190, at 529–33 
(arguing that agency articulations of the limits on their own power would 
address concerns about excessive delegations of discretion). 
 322. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1829 (2012) (defining the scope of legal foreign 
intelligence searches and surveillance). 
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surveillance of Americans absent probable cause that those 
Americans are agents of a foreign power.323 The content of the 
Guidelines and the activities they regulate—such as physical 
surveillance of Americans, infiltration of religious or political 
groups, the use of informants, requests for internet history—
rarely fall within the FISC’s jurisdiction. Individuals who wish to 
challenge FBI activity—if they can establish standing—do not 
have access to the FISC.324 Thus, it is unclear what role the FISC 
could play in reviewing many activities in which the FBI engages. 
The FISC, too, is likely to share the FBI and ODNI’s bias 
toward the security mission. Unless a recipient of a FISC order 
challenges the legitimacy of that order, proceedings in the FISC 
are not subject to an adversarial process.325 Instead, like 
magistrate judges considering whether to issue traditional search 
warrants, FISC judges review unopposed government 
applications for surveillance orders.326 The FISC thus receives 
                                                                                                     
 323. See id. § 1801(b) (defining the term “agent of a foreign power”).  
 324. See id. § 1806(e)–(h) (discussing the means by which a person may 
challenge the use of electronic surveillance in a trial or hearing).  
 325. See Rascoff, supra note 6, at 642–44 (explaining that judicial review 
before the FISC and traditional judicial review differ because FISC review lacks 
a meaningful adversarial process). Third parties generally lack “incentives . . . 
to challenge government requests for information.” Id. at 644. 
 326. See id. at 639 (discussing the application process for surveillance to the 
FISC); 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (detailing the requirements of an application for court 
order to the FISC). In the wake of the NSA surveillance revelations in 2013, 
some proposals have emerged to inject an adversarial element into FISC 
proceedings. See, e.g., Matt Sledge, Adam Schiff Prepares FISA Court Bill To 
Create Special Privacy Advocate, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2013, 3:42 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/adam-schiff-fisa-court_n_3653946.ht 
ml (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (describing one Congressman’s plans to introduce 
legislation creating a special privacy advocate who would appear before the 
FISC to represent the public interest) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2013) (advocating that FISC judges appoint a lawyer to 
represent the public interest when novel questions come before it) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The likely success of such proposals is 
uncertain; United Kingdom and Canadian efforts in this vein have been roundly 
criticized. See JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT AND POST-CHARGE QUESTIONING, 2006–2007, 
H.L. 157, H.C. 394, at 49–55 (U.K.) (describing the functions of and concerns 
with the use of Special Advocates to represent the interest of excluded parties in 
closed hearings). 
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only the Justice Department’s perspective—heavily informed by 
the FBI’s perspective—about any given rule. This concern is 
compounded by the fact that even the judges themselves largely 
hail from the law enforcement community—twelve of the fourteen 
judges who have served this year are former prosecutors and one 
is a former state police director.327 Moreover, once selected by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for FISC service, these judges 
are exposed to a constant stream of government applications to 
engage in foreign intelligence collection detailing just how 
dangerous the world can be and the important role that 
intelligence collection plays in combating those dangers.328 FISC 
involvement thus serves only to reinforce the pro-security 
perspective already embedded in the development of domestic-
intelligence-collection policies. 
Finally, Justice Department briefings to congressional 
committees and to interested nongovernmental organizations 
shortly before the current Guidelines were officially issued can be 
interpreted as evidence of “the possible emergence in the 
domestic intelligence arena of a new ethic of interest group 
representation.”329 This form of participation, however, left many 
interested parties unsatisfied330 and bore only “a passing 
resemblance” to traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking.331 
These meetings permitted stakeholders to see (but not to copy or 
retain) a near-final draft of the document weeks before its 
implementation. But the Guidelines were entirely subject to the 
                                                                                                     
 327. John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, The Judges Who Preside Over 
America’s Secret Court (June 21, 2013 1:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/06/21/us-usa-security-fisa-judges-idUSBRE95K06H20130621 (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2013) (describing the professional background of the FISC 
judges) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 328. See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., to the Honorable Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf (reporting on 
the 1,856 applications made to the FISC in 2012). 
 329. Rascoff, supra note 6, at 644–66. 
 330. See id. at 646 (quoting Senator Russ Feingold asking FBI Director 
Robert Mueller: “Why can’t you at least solicit . . . suggestions in a meaningful 
process that involves more than a single meeting where the participants aren’t 
even allowed . . . to keep a copy [of the draft guidelines]?”). 
 331. Id. at 645.  
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Attorney General’s discretion with respect to whether to respond 
to or to take any views expressed at these meetings into 
consideration. This superficial involvement of interested parties 
does not provide sufficiently broad, meaningful participation 
outside the Justice Department and the FBI to alleviate the 
accountability and democracy deficit with the Guidelines and 
DIOG.  
B. Oversight of Procedural Requirements 
One possible objection to this Article’s proposals is that, in 
eschewing judicial review and conceding the secret nature of the 
Guidelines regime, they relinquish all means of enforcing their 
requirements. As with the proposed procedural rules themselves, 
however, the principles behind the administrative state’s 
compliance mechanisms offer a (partial) solution.332 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking employs the transparency 
of the rulemaking process followed by public and judicial review 
to enforce the regulatory regime to which agency decision making 
is subjected.333 The public’s role in that regime is to play 
watchdog. Because rulemaking and its results are conducted in a 
transparent fashion, interested stakeholders can be relied upon 
to object if they believe that an agency has not acted 
appropriately.334 The public will scrutinize not only proposed 
rules to ensure that they do not suffer from procedural, logical, or 
evidentiary deficiencies, but also any information that is made 
public as part of the process. If, for example, an Environmental 
Impact Statement predicts dire environmental consequences from 
a proposed agency action, environmental activists will use that 
                                                                                                     
 332. See supra Part III.D.2 (explaining how the procedural rule changes 
discussed offer a second-best option). 
 333. See Aftergood, supra note 234, at 399 (“[T]he free flow of information to 
interested members of the public is a prerequisite to their participation in the 
deliberative process and to their ability to hold elected officials accountable.”). 
 334. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 59 (1995) (naming a number of benefits that informal 
rulemaking confers on society, including the fact that “rulemaking enhances 
fairness by allowing all potentially affected members of the public to participate 
in the decision-making process”). 
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Statement to lobby not only the agency but also Congress and the 
President to prevent the agency from taking the proposed 
action.335 Another important compliance-related element of public 
scrutiny is the fact that it can lead to legal challenges to agency 
rules. If a regulated entity believes that a regulation applied to it 
was adopted through flawed procedures, it can bring suit, thereby 
subjecting the regulation to judicial review.336 Through this 
review, courts serve to confirm that agency decisions are not 
unjustified exercises of discretion and that they followed the 
mandated procedures.337 Consequently, courts engage in a 
“searching and careful” review of the record an agency makes of 
its decision-making process338 and will invalidate the results of 
proceedings that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”339 These standards are 
not necessarily particularly stringent, but like public scrutiny, 
                                                                                                     
 335. See, e.g., Sierra Club Continues the Fight Against the Keystone XL Tar 
Sands Pipeline: Case Updates, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/environ 
mentallaw/lawsuits/0476.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (detailing the Sierra 
Club’s lobbying efforts against the Keystone XL Tar Sands Pipeline) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 336. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985) (“The 
task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review 
to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing 
court.”). 
 337. See Sunstein, supra note 192, at 63 (“A principal concern is that 
without the procedural and substantive requirements of [judicial review], the 
governing values may be subverted . . . .”); id. at 68 (“[P]rocedural rights are 
created because of a perception that the existing processes of representation are 
an inadequate guaranty that the outcome will be something other than the 
result of private whim.”). 
 338. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 
(1971) (noting that an agency must consider the “whole record” in making a 
rule, and courts are entitled to review the full administrative record to evaluate 
the challenged action). 
 339. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n. of the 
U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (noting that 
courts will reject reasoning “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise”); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 
416 (explaining that agency decisions reflecting a “clear error of judgment” are 
unacceptable). Agency decisions are also struck down because the agency “relied 
on factors” that Congress did not authorize, State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; the 
agency failed to consider “relevant factors,” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; or 
the agency failed to “consider obvious alternatives,” City of Brookings Mun. Tel. 
Co. v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 1153, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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they do ensure that agency decisions have been reached through 
the proper procedures and therefore that they are reasoned 
rather than arbitrary or irrational.  
Perhaps just as importantly, the roles that the public and the 
courts play impose an important “prior restraint” on agencies. 
Knowing that their rules and the justifications that they offer for 
them will be public and potentially subject to judicial scrutiny, 
agencies will be more likely to be conscientious, hoping to ensure 
that their decision-making processes pass judicial muster.340 In 
other words, they will take any procedural requirements 
seriously from the outset knowing that, if they do not, any 
resulting rule could ultimately be invalidated.  
Fashioning equally effective means of supervising Justice 
Department or FBI compliance with any relevant rules is a 
challenge, because the transparency that facilities both public 
scrutiny and judicial review is concededly difficult to replicate. 
Any proceedings regarding the Guidelines that take place outside 
of public view are shielded from the public-as-watchdog. If the 
relevant rules were legislatively mandated, challenges to any 
failure to abide by them theoretically could be reviewed by the 
courts.341 But even in the unlikely event that Congress imposes 
procedural requirements akin to those suggested here, such suits 
will fall prey to the same barriers that currently exist to 
challenging the FBI’s intelligence-collection activities—any 
individual or entity seeking to challenge the Guidelines or the 
DIOG on the grounds that they did not follow the required 
procedures would struggle to establish standing and to overcome 
the state secrets privilege.342  
As with the reforms suggested to channel the Justice 
Department’s discretion and to improve the participatory nature 
of the Guidelines’ development process, ensuring compliance with 
procedural requirements would necessitate a means of 
approximating the traditionally public and judicial roles. One 
                                                                                                     
 340. See Pierce, supra note 334, at 68 (noting that judicial review can be 
beneficial to the extent that “it induces agencies to consider issues and values 
agencies otherwise would be tempted to ignore”). 
 341. See supra note 337–39 and accompanying text (discussing the standard 
of review imposed on agency actions by the APA). 
 342. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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option in this regard would be to enlist proxies within the 
executive branch to engage in scrutiny of the decision-making 
process, to inquire whether the process complied with any 
required procedures, and to consider whether the required 
statement(s) of justification are adequate. A government 
watchdog could be assigned to take the place of the public and 
judicial watchdogs that normally play this role.343 The Justice 
Department’s Inspector General (IG)—who is statutorily 
empowered to conduct audits, investigations, inspections, and 
reviews of Justice Department programs and to issue reports to 
Congress regarding the results of any investigations that it does 
conduct—might play a constructive role in holding the Attorney 
General and FBI Director accountable for following any 
applicable procedural rules. The IG investigates not only alleged 
violations of the law by DOJ employees, but also audits and 
inspects DOJ programs regularly.344 That office could perform 
reviews of the process employed each time the Guidelines or the 
DIOG are amended. Audits conducted by the IG would be 
especially effective in replicating the effects of traditional 
transparency if the results of those audits could be released 
publicly. Indeed, IGs have, at times, played quite important roles 
in uncovering violations of law and policy in pursuit of security.345 
Perhaps more than any other oversight mechanism (with the 
exception of unlawful leaks of classified information), audit 
reports from the Justice Department’s Inspector General have 
shed light on the FBI’s investigative activities in the wake of 
9/11. These reports, some of which revealed violations of law or 
                                                                                                     
 343. See supra note 334 and accompanying text (describing the role of the 
citizen as “watchdog” over agency actions).  
 344. See About the Office, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST.,http://www.justice.gov/oig/about/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (detailing the 
structure and duties of the Inspector General’s office) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 345. See Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within, supra note 7, at 1047–48 
(discussing the Inspector General’s review of coercive interrogation techniques 
used by the CIA). But see id. at 1048–49 (pointing out risks to Inspectors-
General independence given their location within an agency and noting that 
agencies are often reluctant to provide full information to an Inspector General 
conducting investigations). 
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policy, drew both public and congressional attention, and 
consequently prompted changes to internal FBI policy.346 
To be sure, even publicly released IG conclusions would lack 
some of the other compliance-enhancing characteristics of public 
and judicial scrutiny. The IG does not have the power to 
invalidate rules that are adopted through flawed procedures or 
lack sufficient justification. It can point out flaws and 
insufficiencies, but ultimately any findings or recommendations 
would be nonbinding. This absence of compulsory power sacrifices 
some of the sword-of-Damocles threat inherent in the promise of 
judicial review. If, however, the findings and recommendations 
can be made public, the threat of reputational costs to the FBI 
still imposes some ex ante incentive to comply with required 
procedures. And IGs have been particularly successful in 
generating public reports for reviews of even the most sensitive 
programs.347  
An alternative, though less promising, option would be to 
rely upon Congress to monitor compliance through either the 
General Accounting Office, which regularly audits and reviews 
agency programs on behalf of Congress, or the congressional 
oversight committees themselves. This option is less promising 
than the IG, however, because Congress already has the power to 
insist on these types of procedures but has chosen not to 
intervene when it comes to the Guidelines and the DIOG. Indeed, 
                                                                                                     
 346. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW 
OF THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 124 (2007) (discussing the 
Inspector General’s findings with regard to the FBI’s improper use of national 
security letters); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW 
OF THE FBI’S USE OF NSLS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND 
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, 8–12 (2008) (detailing the FBI’s efforts to 
reduce the improper use of NSLs and noting further measures to ensure 
elimination of the NSL problems identified); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF EXIGENT LETTERS AND 
OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTS FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS 64–78 (2010) (detailing 
several additional FBI practices that were found to be inappropriate and 
improper). 
 347. See, e.g., OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF 
JUST., CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM (2009) (detailing a review of the President’s classified terrorist 
surveillance program to detect and prevent further attacks on the United States 
organized after Sept. 11, 2001). 
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in 2008, several members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
voiced concerns about imminent changes in the Guidelines.348 The 
Attorney General was under no obligation to take those concerns 
into account, however, and he did not respond to the Senators’ 
correspondence.349  
V. Conclusion 
Domestic intelligence collection presents a challenge in a 
democracy. While it can play a crucial role in keeping our nation 
secure, it also poses threats to the very freedoms that make that 
nation worth defending. When the prevention of terrorism is 
viewed as a regulatory problem—one to be managed rather than 
defeated—the challenge becomes more manageable. Examining 
regulatory strategies developed over the past half-century in the 
administrative state provides a roadmap for the development of 
structural and procedural mechanisms to channel executive 
discretion into reasoned, evidence-based decisions; to include 
viewpoints from outside the intelligence community in the 
process; and to ensure that the Justice Department explicitly 
takes into account the civil liberties perspective.350 The need to 
substitute alternative mechanisms for tools that are often 
effective in governing agency action, such as judicial review and 
public scrutiny, means that they may be less directly effective in 
achieving their goals.351 But developing such a framework is a 
                                                                                                     
 348. See Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senator, Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. 
Senator, Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senator, to The Honorable Michael Mukasey, 
Attorney Gen. (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/docu 
ments/upload/110thCongress-2008Documents.pdf (notifying the Attorney 
General of substantial concerns about the new Guidelines). 
 349. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 533, 534 (2012) (outlining the role of the 
Attorney General and the foundation for the Attorney General’s power to craft 
the Guidelines); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981) 
(detailing the goals and certain requirements of United States intelligence 
activity).  
 350. See supra Part III (discussing the framework for governance of the 
administrative state and proposing a governance framework for the rules 
governing FBI’s intelligence collection programs).  
 351. See supra Part IV (noting that traditional tools for agency governance 
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viable second-best option in a context where the traditional 
means of government oversight break down.352 It will contribute 
to generating the appropriate FBI for the twenty-first century, 
one that takes into account not only the nature of the disease, but 
also the potential costs of the cure. 
  
                                                                                                     
are not available in the intelligence-collection context and alternative tools may 
need to be substituted).  
 352. See supra Part IV. 
